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CRIMINAL LAW 
LOST IN TRANSLATION: DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE, “THE PERSONAL IS 
POLITICAL,” AND THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 
KIMBERLY D. BAILEY∗
Current criminal justice domestic violence policies have been severely 
criticized by some feminist scholars as undermining victim autonomy.  This 
criticism is puzzling given the fact that these policies were drafted in 
response to the activism of feminists involved in the early battered women’s 
movement and that autonomy, or the agency of women, was a key goal of 
this movement.  This apparent paradox can be explained, however, by the 
fact that activists involved in the early battered women’s movement and 
actors in the current criminal justice regime speak in two different 
“languages.”  Thus, victim autonomy is a concept that got lost in the 
translation of some of the goals of the early battered women’s movement 
into criminal justice policy.  While this Article acknowledges that victim 
autonomy is not the chief goal of the criminal justice system, it still urges 
proponents of current criminal justice policies to take seriously the fact that 
a high number of victims currently do not want to engage with the criminal 
justice system.  This number is an important metric in analyzing the 
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effectiveness of domestic violence policies.  First, it underscores the fact 
that improvements need to be made in victims’ interactions with the 
criminal justice system and in the criminal justice system’s response to 
those victims who do ask for help.  Second, it highlights the fact that the 
criminal justice system is a limited tool in addressing what is a social, 
political, and economic problem.  For this reason, a criminal justice 
solution should be part of broader domestic violence policies that address 
the complexity of this issue.  The economic disparities that women 
experience as a class and the intersectionality of race, class, sexuality, and 
gender are important aspects of a broader approach to the domestic 
violence problem. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the difficulties of language translation is that it is impossible to 
capture perfectly the meaning that is signified by the words in one language 
in the words of another.  A good translation will serve utilitarian purposes 
in that basic concepts are communicated between parties.  Yet, it is often 
the case that a word in one language does not have a perfect counterpart in 
another language, and it is inevitable that certain nuances and cultural 
meanings get lost in the translation process.  A similar phenomenon has 
occurred with respect to domestic violence policy.  Specifically, the current 
debate regarding domestic violence criminal justice policies underscores the 
difficulties of translating the vision of the early battered women’s 
movement into the “language” of the criminal justice system. 
Current criminal justice domestic violence policies have been severely 
criticized by some feminist scholars as disregarding victim autonomy.1  
This critique is puzzling given the fact that feminist activism within the 
women’s liberation movement was a driving catalyst in the creation of a 
criminal justice response to domestic violence2 and that one of the 
important goals expressed in this movement was the autonomy of women.3
 
1 See, e.g., Donna Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Violence 
Law: A Critical Review, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 801 (2001); Leigh Goodmark, Autonomy 
Feminism: An Anti-Essentialist Critique of Mandatory Interventions in Domestic Violence 
Cases, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.  1 (2009); Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA 
L. REV. 741 (2007). 
  
2 See infra Part II.A. 
3 See infra Part II.A.  I define “autonomy,” or what some call “agency,” as a person’s 
ability to have decisionmaking authority in her life, even if under constrained circumstances.  
See infra Part II for further discussion.  While the concept of autonomy has been the subject 
of much debate within feminist scholarship, see infra note 124, the general advocacy for 
decisionmaking authority in women’s lives can be found throughout feminist literature 
discussing the issues of rape reform and abortion.  See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Rape, 
Violence, and Women’s Autonomy, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 359, 359–60 (1993) (discussing the 
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Indeed, feminists involved in the early battered women’s movement, which 
evolved from the women’s liberation movement,4 did see a place for victim 
autonomy within domestic violence policy and initially envisioned that 
victims would determine when the criminal justice system would intervene 
when they experienced violence in their personal lives.5
This Article argues, however, that acknowledging that victim 
autonomy is not the chief priority of criminal justice policies does not mean 
that proponents of these policies should not be concerned about the fact that 
so many domestic violence victims currently do not want to engage with the 
criminal justice system.  It has been estimated that as many as sixty to 
eighty percent of domestic violence victims ultimately either recant their 
testimony or refuse to testify altogether against their batterers.
  Those scholars 
who currently advocate for more victim autonomy in criminal justice 
policy, therefore, speak in the same language as those activists involved in 
the early battered women’s movement.  The reality is, however, that this 
early vision of victim autonomy is simply not translatable within the 
context of the current American criminal justice regime.  Crime is viewed 
as a violation against the state, not just the victim.  Thus, the concept of 
complete victim autonomy does not have much meaning within the criminal 
justice system, and victim autonomy is not the primary priority of the 
current criminal justice response to domestic violence. 
6  Moreover, 
it is believed that domestic violence is underreported.7
 
effort in rape law reforms to protect female sexual autonomy); Linda R. Hirshman, Bronte, 
Bloom, and Bork: An Essay on the Moral Education of Judges, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 177, 205–
06 (1988) (defining the issue of abortion as an autonomy issue).  More controversially, some 
feminists have advocated for the legalization of prostitution and pornography on autonomy 
grounds.  See Beverly Balos, The Wrong Way to Equality: Privileging Consent in the 
Trafficking of Women for Sexual Exploitation, 27 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 137, 163–64 (2004) 
(discussing the feminist debate on prostitution); Anita Bernstein, Better Living Through 
Crime and Tort, 76 B.U. L. REV. 169, 182 n.48 (1996) (discussing the feminist-libertarian 
approach to pornography). 
  For this reason, 
there are probably many women who do not report their abuse to the 
authorities at all.  The limited number of domestic violence victims who 
actually engage with the criminal justice system is an important metric in 
determining the effectiveness of this system. 
4 See infra Part II.A. 
5 See infra Part II.A. 
6 EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
RESPONSE 87 (1996); Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 
747, 751 (2005). 
7 DONALD G. DUTTON, THE DOMESTIC ASSAULT OF WOMEN: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE PERSPECTIVES 218 (1995); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered 
Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 11 (1991). 
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Part II of this Article will discuss the inherent difficulty in translating 
some of the goals of the early battered women’s movement into criminal 
justice policy.  It will first discuss how the women’s liberation movement 
was an important catalyst in changing the perception that domestic violence 
is a private matter that should be resolved in the home.  Arguing that the 
“personal is political,” activists convincingly made the case that domestic 
violence is actually a political issue that requires political solutions.  This 
activism led to the battered women’s movement, and early activists initially 
envisioned that victims would have autonomy in determining when the 
criminal justice system would intervene in their lives.  While this concept of 
victim autonomy made sense in the context of the battered women’s 
movement, it got lost in the translation of the early battered women’s 
movement’s activism into current criminal justice policy, which is primarily 
focused on prosecution and punishment.8
Part III will then argue that although complete victim autonomy is not 
the primary focus of the criminal justice system, proponents of current 
domestic violence policies should still be concerned about the large number 
of women who do not engage with the criminal justice system.  This 
number is an important metric in determining the effectiveness of this 
system in addressing this problem.  This Part will first make the case that 
the criminal justice system is an important component of domestic violence 
policies.  It then argues that the high number of victims who do not want to 
engage with the criminal justice system highlights the need for 
improvement in the interactions that victims have with the criminal justice 
system and in the level of responsiveness that this system has to victims 
when they do ask for help.  This Part further argues that the lack of 
engagement of victims highlights the fact that criminal justice solutions 
must be part of broader domestic violence policies that address the social, 
political, and economic aspects of this issue.  Addressing the economic 
disparities of women as a class and the intersectionality of race, class, 
sexuality, and gender are important aspects of these broader policies. 
 
While developing a global solution to the problem of domestic 
violence is beyond the scope of this article, Part IV offers some 
considerations for future reform.  It offers examples of jurisdictions that 
provide some models for improving upon domestic violence victims’ 
experiences with the criminal justice system.  This Part also recommends 
that empirical studies that suggest that not all intimate violence fits the 
 
8 It has been argued that current criminal justice policies are quite consistent with 
dominance feminism, which values safety and perpetrator accountability over autonomy.  
See Goodmark, supra note 1, at 4–5.  Rather than focusing on a particular strand of 
feminism, however, this Article focuses on the goals of the early battered women’s 
movement. 
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Coercive Controlling Violence model be used to inform future domestic 
violence policy.  Finally, this Part cautions that regardless of the activism of 
early feminists, many victims still view the violence that they experience in 
their homes as a private matter.  This viewpoint also needs to be 
incorporated into future domestic violence policy. 
II. THE INHERENT DIFFICULTY IN TRANSLATING THE BATTERED  
WOMEN’S MOVEMENT INTO CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY 
A. THE FEMINIST DECONSTRUCTION OF THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE 
DICHOTOMY AND THE BATTERED WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 
The current focus of domestic violence law and policy on the criminal 
justice system is a recent phenomenon.  By 1920, wife beating9 was illegal 
in all states,10 yet for decades the police and prosecutors did very little to 
enforce these laws.11  Because domestic violence was viewed as a private 
matter, victims got very limited responses to their cries for help; if the 
police responded to them at all, the typical response was to separate the 
parties involved and to try to act as a peacemaker, rather than to make an 
arrest.12
This perspective that the state should play a minimal role in regulating 
matters within the family unit is linked to the public/private dichotomy 
described by John Locke and advocated by other liberal theorists.
 
13  
According to these theorists, the state’s role is to protect people and their 
property while guaranteeing maximum freedom from interference from the 
state and others.14
 
9 Anglo-American common law provided that a husband could subject his wife to 
corporal punishment or “chastisement” with the only limitation being that he could not 
inflict permanent injury.  Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as a Prerogative 
and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2122–23 (1996). 
  Because individuals often have competing interests, 
liberal theorists assert that the state has a legitimate role in regulating the 
public sphere and individuals consent to such regulation as participating 
10 Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic 
Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1857 (1996). 
11 Siegel, supra note 9, at 2170–71. 
12 Id. 
13 Carole Pateman, Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Dichotomy, in PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE IN SOCIAL LIFE 281, 283–84 (Stanley I. Benn & G.F. Gaus eds., 1983).  In this 
context, the term “public” means the areas of life that are legitimate for state regulation; the 
term “private” refers to the areas of life where state regulation is deemed illegitimate.  
ALISON M. JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE 34 (1983).  Generally speaking, 
liberal theorists believe that every person has “intrinsic and ultimate value” and that political 
institutions must be constructed in ways that prevent the subordination of one person to the 
will or judgment of others.  Id. at 33. 
14 JAGGAR, supra note 13, at 33. 
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members of society.15  In order to maximize one’s autonomy and ability for 
self-fulfillment, however, the state should limit its regulation of the private 
sphere, which includes matters related to the home and the family.16
Arguing that “the personal is political,” feminist scholars and activists 
have taken a variety of approaches in critiquing this so-called dichotomy 
between the public and private and in demonstrating that making such a 
division can have harmful effects on women.  The phrase “the personal is 
political” first originated as the title of an essay written by Carol Hanisch in 
1970.
 
17  In this essay, Hanisch criticized those who characterized 
consciousness-raising groups18 as “personal” therapy sessions.19  She 
argued that this characterization suggested that women are to blame for 
their so-called personal problems in the home and that these women must 
change themselves as a solution to these problems.20  Instead, Hanisch 
insisted that there are political explanations not only for women’s situation 
in the public sphere, but also for their situation inside of the home.21  
Hanisch argued, “Women are messed over, not messed up!  We need to 
change the objective conditions, not adjust to them.”22
First, some have noted that it is simply false to even suggest that the 
state has not always regulated the so-called private sphere.  In fact, the law 
and social norms have always both defined and regulated contract, property, 
marriage, divorce, and child custody.
  Thus, the feminist 
critique of the public/private dichotomy seeks to deconstruct the liberal 
notion that the home is a personal and non-political sphere. 
23
Supporters of nonintervention [of the state in family matters] insist that the state 
protect families from third-party interference . . . .  Once the state undertakes to 
prevent such third-party action, the state must make numerous policy choices, such as 
what human grouping constitutes a family and what happens if parents disagree.  
These choices are bound to affect the decisions people make about forming families, 
the distribution of power within the family, and the assignment of tasks and roles 
among family members.  The state is responsible for the background rules that affect 
  Frances Olsen has argued: 
 
15 Id. at 34. 
16 Id. 
17 Carol Hanisch, The Personal is Political, in NOTES FROM THE SECOND YEAR: 
WOMEN’S LIBERATION 76 (Shulamith Firestone ed., 1970). 
18 Consciousness-raising groups were small meetings where women met to discuss their 
common experiences.  For further discussion, see infra notes 44–54 and accompanying text. 
19 Hanisch, supra note 17, at 76. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 76–77. 
22 Id. at 76. 
23 Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 835, 842–44 (1985); see also Melissa Murray, Strange Bedfellows: Criminal Law, 
Family Law, and the Legal Construction of Intimate Life, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1253, 1255–56 
(2009) (arguing that criminal law has always regulated family life). 
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people’s domestic behaviors.  Because the state is deeply implicated in the formation 
and functioning of families, it is nonsense to talk about whether the state does or does 
not intervene in the family.24
Furthermore, some critique the public/private dichotomy as stemming 
from an idealized male view of the home as a place to retreat from the stress 
of the outside world and the natural place where one can maximize one’s 
self-fulfillment.  Instead of being a place to maximize their self-fulfillment, 
however, the home has historically been a place of subordination of 
women.
 
25  Thus, radical feminists26 such as Catharine MacKinnon argue 
that the personal interactions that women have in the home are political 
because the domination of women appears in every area of their lives.27  To 
these feminists, all interactions between men and women are 
institutionalized relationships of power that are appropriate for political 
analysis.28  Male power is exercised in the home through the marital 
relationship and the distribution of housework and child-rearing.29  These 
feminists eschew “[t]he assumption that these institutions and practices are 
‘natural,’ or of purely individual concern.”30  Instead, this notion of a 
private sphere “is shown to be an ideological curtain that conceals the 
reality of women’s systematic oppression.”31  Furthermore, for many 
women, their subordination is reinforced by rape and other forms of 
physical and emotional violence.32  Women and children will not 
adequately be protected, therefore, if the public/private distinction is drawn 
in such a way that the relations between family members are not regulated 
by the state.33
When clerks in a local court harass a woman who applies for a restraining order 
against the violence in her home, they are part of the violence.  Society is organized to 
permit violence in the home; it is organized through images in mass media and 
through broadly based social attitudes that condone violence . . . .  Some police 
  Moreover, by not intervening, the state is complicit in this 
violence: 
 
24 Olsen, supra note 23, at 837. 
25 SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 129 (1989). 
26 Radical feminists are associated with the belief that the root of all systems of 
oppression is the oppression of women.  JAGGAR, supra note 13, at 84.  Their goal has been 
described as “uncovering and eradicating the systematic or root causes of women’s 
oppression.”  Id.  For examples of theorists who are considered to be radical feminists, see 
ANDREA DWORKIN, WOMAN HATING (1974); SHULAMITH FIRESTONE, THE DIALECTIC OF SEX 
(1970); CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989). 
27 JAGGAR, supra note 13, at 101; MACKINNON, supra note 26, at 193–94.  
28 JAGGAR, supra note 13, at 101; MACKINNON, supra note 26, at 193–94. 
29 JAGGAR, supra note 13, at 101; MACKINNON, supra note 26, at 193–94. 
30 JAGGAR, supra note 13, at 101. 
31 Id.; see also MACKINNON, supra note 26, at 193–94. 
32 MACKINNON, supra note 26, at 193–94. 
33 See id.; OKIN, supra note 25, at 129. 
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officers refuse to respond to domestic violence . . . .  Some clerks and judges think 
domestic violence matters do not belong in court.  These failures to respond to 
domestic violence are public, not private, actions.34




In addition to noting how the veil of privacy around the home keeps 
women unsafe and vulnerable, MacKinnon also argues that the personal is 
political because the production/public sphere is intimately connected to the 
reproductive/private sphere.
 
36  MacKinnon points out how women literally 
produce the labor pool through reproduction.37  She also notes that male 
workers traditionally have been able to focus on work outside of the home 
because they have women performing unpaid work in the home.38  
Furthermore, discrimination in the public sphere keeps women poor and 
socially dependent on men in the private sphere.39  As Deborah L. Rhode 
has articulated, “Public opportunities shape private choices just as private 
burdens constrain public participation.  Women’s unequal responsibilities in 
the home limit options in the world outside it.  Reduced earning capacity in 
the market also correlates with reduced power and increased obligations in 
the family.”40
Thus, the dynamics in the public and private spheres reinforce one 
another.  Carole Pateman characterizes the feminist critique of the 
public/private dichotomy this way: 
 
Feminists have emphasized how personal circumstances are structured by public 
factors, by laws about rape and abortion, by the status of ‘wife’, by policies on 
childcare and the allocation of welfare benefits and the sexual division of labour in the 
home and workplace.  ‘Personal’ problems can thus be solved only through political 
means and political action.41
Pateman acknowledges that for some radical feminists, “the personal is 
political” literally means that there is no distinction between public and 




34 Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language, and 
Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1665, 71–72 (1990). 
  But 
35 Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973, 978 (1991). 
36 MACKINNON, supra note 26, at 66–68. 
37 Id. at 66. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 168. 
40 Deborah L. Rhode, Feminism and the State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1181, 1187 (1994); see 
also MACKINNON, supra note 26, at 168–70; OKIN, supra note 25, at  123. 
41 Pateman, supra note 13, at 295. 
42 Id.; see also MACKINNON, supra note 26, at 191 (“For women the measure of the 
intimacy has been the measure of the oppression.  This is why feminism has had to explode 
the private.  This is why feminism has seen the personal as the political.  The private is 
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for many feminists, the critique of the public/private dichotomy mainly 
seeks to stress the interrelatedness of the public and private spheres.43
During the 1960s and 1970s, the methodology used for making the 
personal political was the consciousness-raising group.
 
44  These groups 
were small gatherings of women where participants discussed their personal 
everyday experiences:45 “Springing up spontaneously in the context of 
friendship networks, colleges and universities, women’s centers, 
neighborhoods, churches, and shared work or workplaces, they were truly 
grassroots.”46  Through the discussion of their personal experiences, 
participants in these groups began to see similarities in their experiences 
and the systematic way that women were treated in society.47  Thus, 
through this sharing these women discovered the political nature of their 
private lives and relationships.48  This discovery removed the isolation that 
many women felt in their lives and led the way to action and 
empowerment.49
For example, a victim of domestic violence who is isolated from those 
who are outside of the home may easily personalize the violence she may 
be experiencing.  She may think that her partner has hit her because she is 
not a good wife or mother.  She may think that she may be able to stop the 
violence in her home if she works on improving these personal 
shortcomings.  If, however, she engages in a discussion with other women 
who also share their stories of abuse, she is no longer isolated and she may 
then see that the problem is much larger than her experience.  She may see 
friends who are unquestionably good cooks who are also being beaten.  She 
may see friends who she believes are undoubtedly good mothers who are 
also being beaten.  She may begin to see that the abuse is not about her 
 
 
public for those for whom the personal is political.  In this sense, for women there is no 
private, either normatively or empirically.  Feminism confronts the fact that women have no 
privacy to lose or to guarantee.”). 
43 Pateman, supra note 13, at 295; see also Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the 
Public/Private Distinction, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1, 29 (1992) (“While there are particular 
contexts in which a feminist agenda can be identified as advocating a change in the 
public/private mix, it is hard to specify even one context or dimension of the distinction in 
which the claim is that the whole category of the private is useless, or that private structuring 
should be discontinued.  The normative debates concern relationships between private and 
public, but their conclusions do not assert that the differences should be obliterated or even 
greatly reduced.”). 
44 MACKINNON, supra note 26, at 83; see also ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED 
WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 35–36 (2000). 
45 MACKINNON, supra note 26, at 84–85. 
46 Id. at 84. 
47 Id. at 84–87. 
48 Id. at 94–95. 
49 Id. 
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personal shortcomings, but rather it seems to have a connection to the 
political status of men and women in general.  This realization may then 
empower women in similar situations to act toward changing the political 
structures that allow violence to occur in their private homes. 
Thus, consciousness-raising groups inspired the creation of shelters for 
domestic violence victims during the early battered women’s movement.50  
These shelters were run by survivors of domestic abuse, and the women 
who lived there were not viewed as “clients,” but rather as active 
participants in the day-to-day organization of the shelter.51  In other words, 
these shelters were based on a grassroots, bottom-up approach where 
everyone, including the residents, had a voice in the goals and direction of 
the shelter.52  Furthermore, early shelters respected women’s choices and 
their decision to either leave or stay in a relationship.53
Indeed, this bottom-up approach was a common thread among various 
feminist organizations throughout the United States during the late 1960s 
and 1970s.
 
54  The women’s liberation movement was made up of 
decentralized, grassroots organizations, and many organizations were 
focused on just a single issue.55  In addition, some women organized based 
on particular theoretical groupings such as radical feminists, social 
feminists, cultural feminists, and Marxist feminists.56  Some women also 
organized by race and created sub-groupings within that race such as black 
radical feminists, black social feminists, and black cultural feminists.57  
Formal procedural structures like Roberts’ Rules of Order were rejected as 
part of the private/public distinction and a more personal, familial form of 
conversing was adopted during meetings.58
To these participants of the women’s liberation movement, therefore, 
making the personal political meant looking at the personal experiences of 
 
 
50 G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the 
Conservatization of the Battered Women’s Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237, 258 (2005). 
51 Id. at 259. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 286, 302. 
54 ROSALYN BAXANDALL & LINDA GORDON, DEAR SISTERS: DISPATCHES FROM THE 
WOMEN’S LIBERATION MOVEMENT 13–14 (2000).  
55 Id. at 14. 
56 Id. at 13.  
57 Id. at 13–14. 
58 Id. at 14–15.  It should be noted that while this grassroots, decentralized approach was 
a hallmark of the women’s liberation movement in the 1970s, not all feminists favored this 
type of approach.  Allowing everyone to have a voice inevitably limits the number of goals 
that can be accomplished.  As a result, liberal feminists who were part of the National 
Organization for Women (NOW) actually adopted a more formalized and centralized 
approach to addressing issues.  Id. at 14.  
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real women in order to learn about the systematic ways that they were 
subordinated and abused in society.59
While feminists involved in the early battered women’s movement at 
first focused on providing resources to women and on creating programs to 
address the social and economic realities that keep women in abusive 
relationships,
  Moreover, making the personal 
political meant creating community among women and removing any 
sources of isolation.  It was this sense of community that created the source 
of empowerment for political action.  But an important aspect of this 
political action was the fact that every woman was to have a voice in how to 
politicize her personal life. 
60 they also saw a role for the criminal justice system in 
addressing this issue.  They noted in particular the lack of enforcement of 
laws against men who committed crimes against women.61  Activists saw 
this under-enforcement as “a symptom of patriarchal values and a tool for 
maintaining gender dominance, in which the state was complicit for its 
failure to intervene.”62  For this reason, the early battered women’s 
movement focused on addressing systematic inequality and patriarchal 
social attitudes.63
Activists spearheaded class action suits against cities and police 
officers that failed to intervene and protect battered women.
 
64  In addition, 
they began training prosecutors and police officers to treat domestic 
violence victims with respect.65  “Such early reforms did not mandate that 
victim’s wishes necessarily coincide with state prosecutorial aims.  Rather, 
they sought to give victims the option to access the legal system or external 
services if they so desired.”66
 
59 SCHNEIDER, supra note 
  Thus, this particular feminist vision of 
making the personal political is not necessarily inconsistent with a vision of 
complete victim autonomy because participants in the early battered 
women’s movement envisioned a criminal justice system where victims 
could choose whether or not to engage with it.  Those feminists who argue 
for more victim autonomy today, therefore, seem to be more in line with 
this earlier vision of the battered women’s movement.  This view, however, 
is not fully translatable within the current criminal justice political system. 
44, at 35. 
60 Gruber, supra note 1, at 748–49.  
61 Id. at 752. 
62 Id. at 754. 
63 Id. at 755. 
64 Id. at 756; Siegel, supra note 9, at 2171; Linda G. Mills, Commentary, Killing Her 
Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV. 550, 558–
59 (1999). 
65 Gruber, supra note 1, at 756. 
66 Id. at 757. 
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B. A LOSS IN TRANSLATION 
It is true that the idea of the state intervening in private interactions is 
not alien to the criminal justice system.67  Crimes such as theft, homicide, 
and assault all are examples of actions committed by private actors that are 
subject to state censure.  Yet, while participants of the early battered 
women’s movement saw women or domestic violence victims as being the 
central focus of the politicization of personal interactions, the central focus 
of the American criminal justice is not just the victim.  When an individual 
violates a criminal law, he is considered to have committed a “‘social 
harm,’ in that the injury suffered involves ‘a breach and violation of the 
public rights and duties, due to the whole community, considered as a 
community, in its social aggregate capacity.’”68  Thus, while the prosecutor 
certainly should consider the victim’s interests and desires when 
prosecuting a case, he technically represents the state, which means that he 
ultimately must act in the interest of the entire community.69  For this 
reason, while a victim can influence the disposition of a criminal case, she 
does not have the authority to dismiss charges on her own.70  In addition, 
judges generally may dismiss a case without consulting the victim.71
What is in the best interest of the entire community is what lawmakers 
and their respective constituents say is best at particular time.  By the late 
1960s, a societal shift occurred where a retributivist view of the criminal 




67 See Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim’s Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 938–
42 (1985) (discussing how, historically, there has been an evolution in criminal law away 
from the “private” sphere toward a “public” one). 
  
The reasons cited for this shift are varied, including an increase in the crime 
68 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 1 (4th ed. 2006) (quoting 4 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 5 (1769)). 
69 Id.; see also Markus Dirk Dubber, The Victim in American Penal Law: A Systematic 
Overview, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 3, 19, 21 (1999) (noting that the community includes both 
the victim and the defendant). 
70 Dubber, supra note 69, at 21. 
71 Id. 
72 See Darryl K. Brown, The Warren Court, Criminal Procedure Reform, and Retributive 
Punishment, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1411, 1423 (2002).  In contrast, during the first half of 
the twentieth century political sensibilities viewed the criminal justice system as being a 
vehicle for rehabilitation and reform.  Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The 
Resilience of Retribution as an Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM.L. 
REV. 1313, 1318–20 (2000).  During this time, liberal theories of crime, which focused on 
curing the causes of crime, such as “poverty, alienation, lack of education, and 
discrimination” were influential.  Henderson, supra note 67, at 943.  There was also a focus 
on protecting the constitutional rights of defendants, which was evident by the Warren 
Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence at the time.  Id. 
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rate,73 a concern that discretionary rehabilitative policies were adversely 
impacting poor African Americans and other cultural minorities,74 and a 
loss of confidence in rehabilitative programs.75  Because of these events, the 
political will of the people drove lawmakers to draft criminal justice 
policies with more of a retributivist focus.76  It cannot be denied, however, 
that politicians also probably affected the will of the people in this regard.77  
Taking advantage of the rising crime rates, politicians saw an appealing 
campaign issue and instituted a “war on crime,” which seized on the fear of 
their constituents by pushing a message that the best way to combat crime is 
to institute severe and harsh punishments on “bad criminals.”78
I was in Philadelphia the other day.  I found that a cab driver who had been cruelly 
murdered and robbed, and the man who murdered and robbed him had confessed the 
crime, was set free because of a Supreme Court decision.  An old woman, who had 
been brutally robbed and then murdered—the man who confessed the crime was set 
free because of a Supreme Court decision . . . .  My friends, when that’s happening in 
  Richard 
Nixon asserted: 
 
73 Henderson, supra note 67, at 945 (noting also that photographs and news reports of 
“riots, burning cities, and vicious and barbaric crimes” fed Americans’ fear of crime and 
their particular fear of interracial crime). 
74 DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 56 (2001) (“The striking thing about this first major assault upon 
the penal-welfarism is the extent to which it was launched from within the framework of 
welfarist, social democracy . . . it continued to view crime as a product of social and 
economic deprivation, and it looked to the state to provide the social reforms and welfare 
support needed to address this social problem.”); see also Brown, supra note 72, at 1425 
(stating that liberal scholars began advocating “just desert” theory of punishment “as a 
means to reduce excessive and inequitable sentencing rather than as a rationale to justify 
more consistently harsh incarceration, as it was used a few years later”). 
75 GARLAND, supra note 74, at 61–63; Michael Tonry, Theories and Policies Underlying 
Guidelines Systems: Obsolescence and Immanence in Penal Theory and Policy, 105 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1233, 1236 (2005). 
76 Dubber, supra note 69, at 5–6.  The importance of public opinion in criminal policy is 
a somewhat recent phenomenon.  “A few decades ago public opinion functioned as an 
occasional brake on policy initiatives: now it operates as a privileged source.  The 
importance of research and criminological knowledge is downgraded and in its place is a 
new deference to the voice of ‘experience’, of ‘common sense’, of ‘what everyone knows’.”  
GARLAND, supra note 74, at 13. 
77 KATHLYN TAYLOR GAUBATZ, CRIME IN THE PUBLIC MIND 5–6 (1995). 
78 Henderson, supra note 67, at 945–47 (noting that the focus of conservatives was on the 
responsibility of the individual rather than on the causes of crime); see also Dianne L. 
Martin, Retribution Revisited: A Reconsideration of Feminist Criminal Law Reform 
Strategies, 36 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 151, 180 (1998) (arguing that the “crime card” has always 
had particular appeal to politicians because it can serve as a distraction from less popular 
initiatives); Tonry, supra note 75, at 1247–48 (noting that calls for increased toughness on 
crime were a part of every presidential campaign from Barry Goldwater in 1964 “until Bill 
Clinton nullified its emotive force by refusing to let Republicans get to his right on law and 
order”). 
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thousands of cases all over America, I say this.  Some of our courts have gone too far 
in their decisions weakening the peace forces as against the criminal forces in the 
United States of America.  And we’re going to change that.79
Thus, the political will of society and the political messages of politicians 
mutually influence each other.
 
80
It was within this context of the general conservatization
 
81 of criminal 
justice policy and the rise of the so-called victims' rights movement82 in the 
1980s that current mandatory domestic violence law policies were drafted.83  
Under mandatory arrest policies, the police are strongly encouraged or 
required to make an arrest if there is probable cause to believe there has 
been a misdemeanor domestic violence violation.84  All fifty states now 
allow warrantless arrests in cases where there is probable cause of a 
misdemeanor domestic violence offense,85 and most states have enacted 
preferential or mandatory arrest statutes.86
 
79 LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS 248 (1983) (quoting language from 
a campaign speech that Nixon made in Ohio two weeks before the 1968 presidential 
election). 
 
80 GAUBATZ, supra note 77, at 5–6 (suggesting that the harsh public opinion about crime 
probably was a precursor to the political “tough on crime” rhetoric, but that politicians 
certainly escalated the public views on this subject through their political messages). 
81 It should be noted that while this retributive focus on crime is generally viewed as a 
conservative approach, many so-called liberal Democrats also have embraced the “tough on 
crime” rhetoric as part of their political platforms.  See GARLAND, supra note 74, at 13–14; 
see also Tonry, supra note 75, at 1247–48. 
82 Aya Gruber notes that the “victims’ rights” movement is not about victim agency.   
[W]hile the movement engages the rhetoric of individual rights and victim autonomy, it is really 
not about victim agency.  Rather than securing victim autonomy without qualification, many 
victims’ rights reforms simply seek to position the victim in the legal system in a way that 
inexorably leads to more liability and punishment for the defendant.  In a sense, the victim is a 
foil, a tool of an even larger and more dangerous program of vigorous individuality and denial of 
social responsibility.  The victims’ rights movement is and always has been a product of 
conservative tough-on-crime ideology. 
Gruber, supra note 1, at 749–50; see also Henderson, supra note 67, at 948–49 (noting that 
the victims’ rights movement was in part in response to the Warren’s Court’s jurisprudence 
which strengthened the constitutional rights of the accused: “The ‘discovery’ of the crime 
victim provided an individual to substitute for the state on the side of the scales opposite the 
accused, thus making it appear that the balance was more ‘equal.’”). 
83 Gruber, supra note 1, at 792–800; see also Deborah M. Weissman, The Personal Is 
Political—and Economic: Rethinking Domestic Violence, 2007 BYU L. REV. 387, 396 (2007) 
(discussing how the “feminist agenda that demanded legal parity for domestic violence with 
other crimes found a receptive environment in the law-and-order agenda of the 1970s and 
1980s”). 
84 Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of Domestic 
Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1669–70 (2004). 
85 Hanna, supra note 10, at 1859.  Prior to 1984, most police officers could not arrest a 
suspect without a warrant unless the misdemeanor was committed in the officer’s presence.  
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In addition, many jurisdictions became more aggressive in prosecuting 
domestic violence cases by instituting no-drop policies, which require or 
encourage prosecutors to prosecute domestic violence cases regardless of 
the victim’s wishes.87  Sometimes hard no-drop jurisdictions will sanction 
or arrest victims who refuse to voluntarily participate in the prosecution.88  
Most jurisdictions with no-drop policies, however, do not force victims to 
participate in the prosecution.89  Instead, when possible, prosecutors use the 
out-of-court statements of victims made in police statements or during 911 
calls in lieu of their live testimony in what are called “victimless” or 
“evidence-based” prosecutions.90
Aya Gruber has documented how proponents of the “war on crime” 
used Nicole Brown Simpson and the image of the vulnerable Caucasian, 
upper-class domestic violence victim as the poster woman for their general 
criminal justice policy of tough prosecution and harsh sentences.
 
91  Indeed, 
mandatory arrest legislation had languished for years in several 
jurisdictions, and it was not until Simpson’s death that there was a political 
push for “zero tolerance” with respect to domestic violence.92  Politicians 
focus on high arrest and prosecution numbers in order to convince their 
constituents that they are doing something tangible to curtail crime, even 
when these actions may not actually be keeping individuals safe.93
 
Officers could arrest a suspect without a warrant if they had probable cause to believe that a 
felony had been committed.  Id. 
  Public 
86 Hanna, supra note 10, at 1859–60. 
87 Mills, supra note 64, at 561. 
88 Hanna, supra note 10, at 1863. 
89 Id. 
90 Kimberly D. Bailey, The Aftermath of Crawford and Davis: Deconstructing the Sound 
of Silence, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1, 2 (2009).  The use of out-of-court statements at trial have 
been limited by the Supreme Court decisions Crawford v. Washington and Davis v. 
Washington.  See id. at 2–3. 
91 Gruber, supra note 1, at 793; see also Martin, supra note 78, at 157–58 (noting that the 
victims’ rights movement only cares about “innocent” and “good” victims and that the 
“unworthy, such as ‘bad’ mothers, ‘bad’ girls, and unruly youth, are never real victims, on 
the other hand”); Henderson, supra note 67, at 951 (noting that with respect to the victims’ 
rights movement, “‘[v]ictims’ are not prostitutes beaten senseless by pimps or ‘johns’”).  It is 
also worth noting that the fact that Nicole Brown Simpsons’ ex-husband, O.J. Simpson, was 
African-American probably also heightened her victimhood given the stereotypes of angry 
black men and vulnerable white women. 
92 Gruber, supra note 1, at 793 n.222. 
93 Martin, supra note 78, at 160 (arguing that when citizens express anger and 
disappointment with the inability of the criminal legal system to keep them safe, politicians 
move away from addressing the complex problem of actual security and toward the symbolic 
and easier task of recognizing the wrong committed); see also Dubber, supra note 69, at 18–
20 (noting that prosecutors’ and judges’ decisions are affected by the electorate). 
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oversight is particularly palpable with respect to domestic violence cases 
after the publicity following Simpson’s murder: 
In the oral culture of a prosecutor’s office, a misdemeanor [domestic violence] 
defendant has the potential to be an O.J. Simpson.  In other words, every case is to be 
treated as a potential prelude to murder.  Rookie prosecutors are warned that their DV 
misdemeanors are the cases that could get their names in the newspaper for failure to 
prevent something more serious.  Thus in DV cases, prosecutors make decisions in the 
shadow of public oversight and have an enhanced incentive to use every means 
available to protect victims.94
It is important to note that during the early stages of the battered 
women’s movement in the 1970s and 1980s, many feminists were quite 
wary of aligning their interests with the state, which represented to them the 
patriarchal domination that they were seeking to overcome.
 
95  But the 
reality was that legal actors did not treat domestic violence victims the same 
as victims of other crimes covered by discretionary arrest and prosecution 
policies.96  G. Kristian Miccio, an advocate instrumental in drafting the 
mandatory arrest policy in New York, has poignantly discussed the 
ambivalence she and other advocates felt about engaging with the state in 
dealing with domestic violence.97  Yet, because women’s cries for help 
were routinely being ignored under discretionary policies, she recalls that 
she felt that feminists had “no other alternative” but to support mandatory 
policies.98  Proponents believed that these policies would enable victims to 
reclaim their bodies from their batterers and that these policies were 
essential for women’s safety and bodily integrity.99
First, feminists who supported these policies believed that making 
arrests and prosecutions mandatory for domestic violence cases would 
ensure formal gender equality because the percentage of domestic violence 
cases prosecuted would equal the number of cases prosecuted with respect 
to other crimes.
 
100  In addition, feminists and advocates for domestic 
violence victims hoped that these policies would deter future violence and 
that they would empower women to remain abuse free.101
 
94 Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2, 44–45 (2006). 
  Finally, 
proponents of mandatory policies felt that these policies had an important 
95 Gruber, supra note 1, at 758. 
96 Id. at 757. 
97 Miccio, supra note 50, at 274–82. 
98 Id. at 279. 
99 Id. 
100 Gruber, supra note 1, at 758. 
101 Id. at 759–60. 
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symbolic value in that it meant that state actors were taking the issue of 
domestic violence seriously.102
There are some who still argue that mandatory policies are an 
important component of domestic violence law and policy.  In addition to 
the reasons detailed above, they argue that mandatory policies prevent 
batterers from intimidating their partners into not proceeding with charges 
against them.
 
103  They also argue that lax prosecution policies will decrease 
police officers’ confidence in the value of arrest and will undermine their 
diligence in policing domestic violence.104  Furthermore, some have argued 
that even if prosecution and incarceration do not rehabilitate batterers, it is 
better to put batterers in jail than to force victims into shelters.105  Finally, 
they argue that domestic violence offenders are a threat to all members of 
society, not just to their intimate partners.106  Some research suggests that 
violent offenders in a family are more likely to assault nonfamily 
members.107  Some scholars also note that batterers will continue to be 
abusive to future partners and that mandatory policies protect children from 
violence.108
Yet, mandatory policies have had staying power not because they have 
actually protected women in the ways that their proponents originally 
hoped, but because they are written in a language that makes sense in a 
retributivist and prosecutorially-focused criminal justice system.  If 
batterers are going to be considered criminals, then they need to be arrested 
and prosecuted.  There is no room for victim ambivalence or hesitancy, and 
victim autonomy simply does not make sense in this context.  For all of 
these reasons, complete victim autonomy got lost in the translation of the 
early battered women’s movement’s vision of domestic violence policy into 
concrete criminal justice policies. 
 
 
102 Id. at 759. 
103 Hanna, supra note 10, at 1892; Sack, supra note 84, at 1673, 1690. 
104 Hanna, supra note 10, at 1893; see also Sack, supra note 84, at 1673. 
105 Donna Wills, Domestic Violence: The Case for Aggressive Prosecution, 7 UCLA 
WOMEN’S L.J. 173, 180 (1997). 
106 Hanna, supra note 10, at 1889. 
107 Id. at 1889. 
108 Id. at 1895–96. 
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III. THE NUMBER OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS WHO ENGAGE WITH 
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS AN IMPORTANT METRIC IN 
DETERMINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CURRENT DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
POLICY 
A. WHY THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS AN IMPORTANT 
COMPONENT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE POLICY 
Some may argue that the criminal justice system should not play any 
role at all within domestic violence law and policy given its impact on 
victim autonomy.  The problem is, however, that it cannot be denied that 
many domestic violence victims do call the police to their aid during and 
after acts of violence.  In addition, many victims want their batterers 
prosecuted.  In fact, sixty-five percent of the African-American women who 
participated in a study by Arlene N. Weisz supported the prosecution of 
their batterer.109
Another potential response to the inevitable tension between complete 
victim autonomy and the goals of the criminal justice system could be that a 
new, victim-centered model for criminal justice should be created.  Under 
this model, the desires and wishes of the victim would determine the role of 
the criminal justice system in a particular circumstance.  For example, one 
potential model could be that instead of focusing on arrest and prosecution 
of the batterer, the focus would be on keeping the victim safe during a 
particular moment.  In some circumstances, that might mean arresting the 
batterer and detaining him for a few hours until the immediate danger has 
passed.  In other circumstances, the victim may determine that the threat 
from the call to the police was all that was needed to diffuse the situation 
and that arrest is not even necessary.  If the victim ultimately decides to 
drop charges or to not prosecute her batterer, she would not be vilified by 
the system under the victim-centered approach.  Instead, each moment that 
the police keep a victim safe would be considered the victory, not the 
successful prosecution and the jail sentence. 
  Furthermore, many victims probably need the resources of 
the criminal justice system in order to be adequately protected from the 
violence in their lives.  Thus, the criminal justice system does play an 
important role for some domestic violence victims, and we do not want to 
go back to a system that is nonresponsive to their needs. 
One potential problem with this model is that there is a danger that the 
police would becomes less responsive to victims if they are asked to make 
repeated calls to the same house with no hope of an ultimate prosecution.  
 
109 HILLARY POTTER, BATTLE CRIES: BLACK WOMEN AND INTIMATE PARTNER ABUSE 84 
(2008).  Hoan N. Bui found that African-American women were more likely to want to 
prosecute their partners than Caucasian women.  Id. 
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Indeed, one of the reasons for instituting no-drop prosecution policies was 
because it was believed that police officers would be more motivated to 
answer domestic violence calls if they believed that the batterer would 
actually be prosecuted; otherwise, police officers would find their actions to 
be futile.110  This prosecutorial focus of the police should not be surprising 
given the current language of the criminal justice system.  There is also still 
evidence that some police officers are not responsive even under mandatory 
policies since they still exercise discretion in determining whether there is 
probable cause of a domestic violence violation.111
Perhaps policies could be instituted to make sure that police officers 
remain responsive.  For example, police officers could be required to 
complete paperwork verifying that they answered domestic violence calls.  
Follow-up interviews could also be conducted with victims who made calls 
to the police.  When there is a pattern of officers ignoring domestic violence 
calls in a particular locale, class action suits could be filed on equal 
protection grounds just as was done in the early part of the battered 
women’s movement.  Realistically, however, this type of follow-up 
probably would be difficult for many jurisdictions to maintain due to 
limited resources.  There is a potential danger, therefore, that a victim-
centered approach could end up going back to a system where criminal 
legal actors do not take domestic violence seriously.
 
112
The other potential problem with the victim-centered approach is that 
there may be occasions where we do not want the victim’s desires to trump 
the interests of the state.  For example, a domestic violence victim may 
have a legitimate need for her batterer to stay out of jail because he is the 
main economic provider for her household.  If her batterer, however, has a 
history where he has committed serious violence not only against his 
domestic partner, but also against members of society at large, it may be in 
the state’s interest to incapacitate him in order to prevent him from being a 
danger not only to the victim, but also to those who are not in an intimate 
relationship with him.  Moreover, there is research that suggests that 





110 See supra note 
  In those situations where the offender has 
exhibited seriously violent behavior, therefore, the state’s interest in 
104 and accompanying text.  
111 Sack, supra note 84, at 1690, 1696.  Prosecutors also have discretion under no-drop 
policies; they just do not have the discretion to drop a case merely because a victim does not 
want to go forward.  Id. at 1696. 
112 Id. at 1688–90 (expressing skepticism that police and prosecutors would be 
responsive to domestic violence victims without mandatory policies). 
113 Eve. S. Buzawa & Aaron D. Buzawa, Courting Domestic Violence Victims: A Tale of 
Two Cities, 7 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 671, 681–82 (2008). 
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protecting both the victim and society at large should trump the victim’s 
desires with respect to the criminal justice system, and we should deal with 
her economic interests through other means.  Finally, the state also has an 
interest in protecting children who experience violence in the home.114
For all of these reasons, the criminal justice system is an important 
component of domestic violence policy, and I acknowledge that the wishes 
of the victim should not always be the priority of the criminal justice 
system.  As I discuss below, however, acknowledging that victim autonomy 
should not always be the priority of the criminal justice system does not 
mean that there is no reason to be concerned about the fact that so many 
domestic violence victims currently choose not to engage with the system. 
 
B. WHY THE LACK OF ENGAGEMENT OF MANY DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
VICTIMS IS A CAUSE FOR CONCERN 
Although the complete autonomy of every domestic violence victim is 
not the main priority of the criminal justice system, the fact that so many 
victims do not want to engage with this system should still be troubling 
because it suggests that this system is not as effective in addressing the 
issue of domestic violence as one might hope.  One would think that more 
victims would take advantage of this resource if it were truly helpful to 
them.  Instead, it has been estimated that as many as sixty to eighty percent 
of domestic violence victims ultimately either recant their testimony or 
refuse to testify altogether against their batterers.115
Some might dismiss these alarming statistics because they believe that 
domestic violence victims are psychologically damaged individuals who 




114 Jennifer Collins, Criminal Law Comes Home to a Family, in CRIMINAL LAW 
CONVERSATIONS 699 (Paul H. Robinson et al. eds., 2009).  But for a discussion regarding the 
complications that arise for battered women who are mothers, including being more 
vulnerable to findings of child neglect and losing custody of their children, see SCHNEIDER, 
supra note 
  For this reason, these 
victims need the state to make decisions for them.  The reality is, however, 
that the profiles of domestic violence victims are much more complex than 
some might presume.  The literature on these victims suggests that many of 
44, at 148–78. 
115 BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 6, at 87; Lininger, supra note 6, at 751. 
116 The sensationalism surrounding homicide cases involving battered women who killed 
their husbands and the introduction of expert testimony on battered women has contributed 
to this stereotype.  See Elaine Chiu, Confronting the Agency in Battered Mothers, 74 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1223, 1243–44 (2001); Martha R. Mahoney, supra note 7, at 36–43.  Feminists 
advocated for the use of this type of expert testimony for the purpose of explaining the 
complexity of these women’s lives; the law and popular culture, however, have distorted 
battered women’s syndrome into a dysfunctional caricature of these women’s lives.  Id.; see 
also SCHNEIDER, supra note 44, at 124–25. 
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them are quite rational individuals who are making the best choices they 
can under constrained circumstances.117
Others might presume that most victims do not engage with the 
criminal justice system because they are afraid of their batterers.  As a 
result, they may fear that giving voice to victims’ desires to not prosecute a 
case essentially allows batterers to control the process.  While fear is 
sometimes a reason that victims hesitate to engage with the criminal justice 
system, there are many other complex and legitimate reasons why they 
choose not to engage.
 
118  Thus, if domestic violence victims are rational and 
have legitimate reasons for not engaging with the criminal justice system, 
we should not be ignoring this lack of engagement.  Instead, we should be 
paying attention to their reasons for not engaging with the system in order 
to determine whether current criminal justice policies are harming them and 
whether there are improvements that can be made within the criminal 
justice system that can help them.  For example, if it is the case that arrest 
and prosecution may put some domestic violence victims in more danger,119 
completely ignoring the victim’s wishes is a serious problem because many 
victims may be able to gauge quite accurately whether criminal justice 
intervention is in their best interest on a particular occasion.120  It is 
particularly troubling that the women who seem to be the most 
detrimentally affected by mandatory policies are the same women who have 
the least amount of political power, specifically, poor women, women of 
color, and immigrants.121
Furthermore, it is believed that domestic violence is underreported.
  Mandatory policies, therefore, seem to be a 
continuation of the voicelessness and subordination that these women 
already experience within the political system. 
122
 
117 See SCHNEIDER, supra note 
  
It seems that many women do not report their abuse to the authorities at all.  
If most resources are directed toward a criminal justice solution to domestic 
violence, this means that there are a lot of women who are not getting any 
help at all.  Donna Coker has documented the ways that mandatory policies 
have made battered women more vulnerable to state control, which can 
44, at 123–24; Chiu, supra note 116, at 1259–60. 
118 These include fear of the batterer, an emotional attachment to the batterer and a desire 
to make the marriage work, and a lack of material resources, safety, and positive interactions 
with the criminal justice system.  Chiu, supra note 116, at 1253; Coker, supra note 1, at 
1048–49. 
119 See supra Part III. 
120 See also Coker, supra note 1, at 826–27; Donna M. Welch, Mandatory Arrest of 
Domestic Abusers: Panacea or Perpetuation of the Problem of Abuse?, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 
1133, 1159–60 (1994). 
121 See infra Part III. 
122 DUTTON, supra note 7, at 218; Mahoney, supra note 7, at 11. 
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ultimately lead to harmful consequences for these women.123
I acknowledge that the concept of autonomy,
  If domestic 
violence victims are not seeking assistance from the state in order to avoid 
these consequences, mandatory policies may be alienating and isolating 
domestic violence victims instead creating the empowerment and sense of 
community that feminists originally envisioned with respect to political 
solutions to private violence. 
124 or the ability to have 
decisionmaking authority in one’s life, is a particularly complicated concept 
in the domestic violence context.  For example, if a woman chooses not to 
prosecute her batterer because he is the main economic provider in the 
family, some might argue that she is not making a “true” choice in the sense 
that she is surely not “choosing” to continue to live in violence, but rather 
she is choosing what she views as the lesser of two evils.  I do not deny the 
constraints in victims’ lives that limit their choices.  Yet, it is important to 
consider whether victims, rather than the state, may sometimes be in the 
best position to make the best choice under those constrained 
circumstances.125  Acknowledging these constraints, however, should not 
lessen the burden on society to create ways to limit the extent that those 
constraints are based on gender, class, and racial subordination so that 
women can make more meaningful choices.126
C. WHAT THE LACK OF ENGAGEMENT TELLS US 
 
In order to examine the lack of victim engagement further, one of the 
key insights from the women’s and early battered women’s movements can 
prove quite helpful: a grassroots approach that focuses on the perspectives 
of individual women can be beneficial in creating effective political 
solutions.  Applying this bottom-up approach, we should focus on why it is 
that so many victims refuse to engage with this system.  Evidence thus far 
shows that there are two important reasons why many victims do not 
engage.  First, there is a need for improvement in the criminal justice 
treatment of domestic violence.  Second, the current focus on the criminal 
 
123 See infra notes 212–214 and accompanying text. 
124 For a discussion on feminist debates regarding how to define autonomy and what role 
the government should play in fostering autonomy, see Linda C. McClain, Toleration, 
Autonomy, and Governmental Promotion of Good Lives: Beyond ‘Empty’ Toleration to 
Toleration as Respect, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 19, 124–29 (1998); Miccio, supra note 50, at 310–16. 
125 But see Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the 
Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384, 426 
(1985) (arguing that individuals do not always make choices in order to increase their own 
well-being, but rather in order to submit to authority). 
126 See infra Part III.C.2. 
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justice system as the main solution to this problem is of limited 
effectiveness given the social, political, and economic aspects of this issue. 
1. Ways the Criminal Justice System Needs to Improve 
a. Poor Interactions with Legal Actors 
By listening to the personal experiences of domestic violence victims, 
one discovers that the quality of victims’ interactions with actors in the 
criminal justice system affects their willingness to participate in the 
prosecution of their batterers.127  One survey found that women were more 
afraid of the courts and the law than they were of harming their relationship 
with their partner or of retaliation from their partner.128  The women’s two 
greatest concerns were that the prosecutors would not prepare them for trial 
and that the defendant would not be found guilty.129  Eve and Carl Buzawa 
also have documented how ill-informed domestic violence victims are 
about the prosecution process, which can lead to high rates of victim 
attrition.130
In addition to a lack of communication and information, some actors in 
the criminal justice system sometimes exhibit a negative response to 
battered women.  Prosecutors are baffled when victims refuse to leave 
abusive partners or to help with the prosecution of their batterers.
 
131  This 
lack of understanding can leave some prosecutors feeling frustrated, 
indifferent, or cynical.132
I felt like I was a walking statistic.  I was this number out of the sociology books, I 
felt like, “You really can’t relate, leave me alone.”  My victim advocate, I forget her 
name, she would ask me questions, go on and on.  I was like, “Lady, leave me alone.  
I’m dealing with trying to pay my rent.” . . .  I felt like, “Leave me alone, I’ve got 
enough going on.  You’re not helping me.  What can you do to help me?  Unless 
  Likewise, victims feel frustrated that prosecutors 
are so out of touch with the everyday realities of their lives.  Hillary Potter 
interviewed a woman who expressed her frustrations this way: 
 
127 Coker, supra note 1, at 840; see also Mills, supra note 64, at 595 (citing studies that 
suggest that when a battered woman has a negative interaction with the state, she is less 
likely to rely on state assistance in the future). 
128  OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE RESEARCH:  
SUMMARIES FOR JUSTICE PROFESSIONALS 13 (Barbara E. Smith ed., 2003), available at 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/202564.pdf (summarizing JOANNE BELKNAP ET AL., 
FACTORS RELATED TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURT DISPOSITIONS IN A LARGE URBAN AREA 
(2000)). 
129 Id. 
130 BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 6, at 95. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
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you’re going to write me a check, you can’t help me . . . .”  I was dealing with my 
own emotions and I still had to get up and cook and do all the things I had to do.133
Prosecutors also may erect barriers that “test” the commitment of 
victims to prosecute.
 
134  This attitude then leads more victims to drop 
charges or to not appear in court, which reinforces the beliefs of 
prosecutors, police, and other staff that becoming involved in domestic 
violence cases is futile.135
Domestic violence victims also have reported that legal and court 
personnel are sometimes demeaning and patronizing.
  Thus, the vicious cycle between the lack of 
cooperation of victims and the negative attitudes among legal actors that 
result from this lack of cooperation continues. 
136  One study found 
that court clerks, who were supposed to help women file protective orders, 
provided little assistance to women with special needs such as literacy 
barriers and language translation.137  In addition, some clerks actively 
discouraged women from filing protective orders.138  Furthermore, there 
have been cases where judges condescendingly trivialized the fears of 
domestic violence victims and ignored their requests for protection, 
ultimately placing these victims in grave danger.139
Poor interactions with the police, who are the first line of defense for 
many domestic violence victims, are particularly troubling.  As has already 
been discussed, police still have quite a bit of discretion even under 
mandatory policies because they must determine whether there is probable 
cause for arrest.  Unfortunately, when dealing with the police, victims have 
found some skeptical of their reports of abuse and suspicious that they are 





133 POTTER, supra note 
  There have also been situations where officers have talked 
109, at 142. 
134 BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 6, at 189. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Kit Kinports & Karla Fischer, Orders of Protection in Domestic Violence Cases: An 
Empirical Assessment of the Impact of the Reform Statutes, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 163, 172 
(1993). 
138 Id. 
139 JAMES PTACEK, BATTERED WOMEN IN THE COURTROOM: THE POWER OF JUDICIAL 
RESPONSES 4–5 (1999) (describing the case of Pamela Dunn who was shot, stabbed, and 
strangled by her husband five months after a judge chastised her for requesting a police 
escort to her apartment to gather her belongings); Bailey, supra note 90, at 45–46 (describing 
the case of Evette Cade whose estranged husband doused her with gasoline and set her on 
fire after a judge ignored Cade’s request to leave a protective order him in place). 
140 POTTER, supra note 109, at 177.  One of the women that Hillary Potter interviewed 
recounted one specific incident as follows: 
At one point I actually did call the police. . . . They came to my house and I thought, “OK, good, 
I’m going to take care of this.”  They told me, “You’re just doing this because you’re mad at 
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to women in the presence of their batterers, limiting the victims’ 
willingness to talk frankly about the abuse.141
The poor interactions between victims and the police may be partially 
explained by the fact that it is has been documented that a significant 
number of police officers may themselves be batterers.  The Neidig Study 
documented that approximately twenty-eight percent of police officers self-
reported that they had committed an act of physical aggression against their 
spouse in the previous year.
 
142  In an unpublished study conducted by Lanor 
Johnson, forty percent of officers “surveyed reported that they had behaved 
violently toward their spouse and/or children in the last six months.”143  If a 
substantial number of police officers are engaging in domestic violence, it 
cannot be expected that they will adequately protect victims from the same 
type of behavior.  Furthermore, as victims sense that the police are not 
taking the violence in their homes seriously, they will be less willing to 
engage with the criminal justice system or less likely to expect that the 
criminal justice system will ever help them.  Finally, victims of abusive 
police officers often feel that they cannot seek out help from the same 
criminal justice that employs their intimate partners.  There has been a great 
deal of media attention surrounding the case of Drew Peterson, the former 
police officer who is suspected of being involved in the disappearance of 
his wife, Stacy Peterson.144  One of the most disturbing allegations related 
to this case is that Stacy was a domestic violence victim who felt that she 
had nowhere to turn because her husband was a police officer.145
b. Lack of Adequate Protection 
 
An attempt to separate from one’s batterer can be very dangerous.146
 
him.  Are you doing this because you want child support?”  I was so hurt.  They was going 
through my drawers and my kitchen and asking me if I was on welfare.  They weren’t even 
asking me what happened.  They were like drilling me.  So after that I killed it.  My whole mind 
and my body and my spirit, I killed it, and I never talked about it again, until one day I finally 
told my mother. 
  
According to Martha Mahoney, “[a]t least half of women who leave their 
abusers are followed and harassed or further attacked by them.  In one study 
Id. 
141 Id. at 178. 
142 Peter H. Neidig, Harold E. Russell, & Albert F. Seng, Interspousal Aggression in Law 
Enforcement Families: A Preliminary Investigation, 15 POLICE STUD.: INT’L REV. POLICE 
DEV. 30, 32 (1992). 
143 Id. at 31. 
144 See The Real Story Here, CHI. DAILY HERALD, May 19, 2009, at A1. 
145 See Erika Slife, When Cop Causes Family Violence; Many Victims May Have 
Nowhere to Turn, Experts Say, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 3, 2008, at W1.  
146 Mahoney, supra note 116, at 80. 
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of interspousal homicide, more than half of the men who killed their 
spouses did so when the partners were separated.”147  Some argue that 
women are safest when they willingly partner with state actors to 
investigate and prosecute domestic violence cases.148  The truth is, however, 
that the criminal justice system often fails to protect these women even 
when they are willing participants.  As has already been discussed, even 
after the institution of mandatory policies, some victims still find the 
criminal justice system nonresponsive to their cries for help.149  If a victim 
has found the system to be nonresponsive in the past, she may determine 
that it is not worth her time to contact the police on future occasions.150
2. Domestic Violence is a Social, Political, and Economic Issue 
  
Moreover, if a victim fears that her partner may retaliate once she contacts 
the police, she certainly is not going to report the abuse if she believes that 
she is not going to be protected from that retaliation.  For these reasons, 
domestic violence victims cannot be expected to engage with the criminal 
justice system if they cannot rely on it for adequate protection. 
Feminists who advocated for a strong criminal justice response to 
domestic violence also recognized that arrest alone was not going to curb 
this problem; criminalization would be meaningless if victims did not also 
have access to housing, jobs, and social support systems.151  Furthermore, 
these feminists were interested in deconstructing the political structures that 
subordinate women and keep them vulnerable to violence.152
 
147 Id. at 64–65. 
  Thus, the 
high lack of engagement of domestic violence victims highlights the fact 
that while the criminal justice system is an important tool, it is an extremely 
limited one.  There are social, political, and economic aspects of domestic 
violence that cannot be addressed within the criminal justice system itself.  
These factors also constrain some victims’ ability or willingness to fully 
148 Mills, supra note 64, at 551. 
149 For examples of victims who found the criminal justice system nonresponsive, see 
Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2004); Bailey, supra note 90, at 45–46. 
150 BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 6, at 78 (“Perhaps the most insidious effect of past 
poor police practices may be a contribution to the inordinately high rates of victims not 
calling the police or victim screening.”); Sara R. Benson, Failure to Arrest: A Pilot Study of 
Police Response to Domestic Violence in Rural Illinois, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & 
L. 685, 700 (2009) (suggesting that inadequate police responses in rural areas may be 
discouraging victims from seeking further assistance). 
151 See Miccio, supra note 50, at 263–67; see also Deborah Tuerkheimer, Recognizing 
and Remedying the Harm of Battering: A Call to Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 959, 1030 (2004) (arguing that criminal law “is a critical component of 
what must necessarily be a multi-faceted enterprise”). 
152 See id. 
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engage with and take advantage of the criminal justice system.  Thus, while 
activists and scholars should continue to advocate for improvements within 
the criminal justice system, they should also view this system as a very 
limited tool that should be part of a broader set of social, political, and 
economic policies. 
a. Limited Economic Resources 
As already discussed, one of the important insights behind the mantra 
“the personal is political” is that the public spheres and the private spheres 
are interrelated.  The fact that women have less economic power than men 
in the public sphere necessarily correlates to their vulnerability to violence 
in their personal lives.153  Women often do not want to testify in court, or 
often recant and testify on behalf of their batterers in court, because of 
limited economic resources.  “Women’s decisions whether or not to support 
criminal justice intervention are often related to whether or not they can 
afford to prioritize prosecution over other more immediate concerns such as 
food, employment, and childcare.”154  For many women, the reality is that 
the incarceration of their spouses means destitution and homelessness for 
their families.155  In addition, many women may not want to report 
domestic violence to the authorities because they do not want to affect 
future job prospects for either themselves or for their partners.156
Furthermore, while the current criminal justice response is based on 
the premise that the victim will separate from her batterer, the reality is that 
many victims cannot afford separation.  A domestic violence victim faces a 
fifty percent chance that her standard of living will drop below the poverty 




153 Donna Coker, Addressing Domestic Violence Through a Strategy of Economic Rights, 
24 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 187, 188 (2003); see also Sack, supra note 
  It also has been estimated 
that nearly half of all homeless women and children have fled violence in 
84, at 1734 (arguing 
that the number one reason women stay with batterers is economic dependence and that the 
most likely predictor of whether a battered woman will permanently separate from her 
abuser is whether she has the economic resources to survive without him); Ola W. Barnett, 
Why Battered Women Do Not Leave, Part 1: External Inhibiting Factors Within Society, 1 
TRAUMA, VIOLENCE & ABUSE 343, 347–49 (2000) (citing several studies that show a positive 
association between a lack of independent income and a woman’s inability to leave an 
abusive relationship). 
154 Coker, supra note 1, at 823; see also Mahoney, supra note 7, at 62 (noting a lack of 
resources for women who separate from their batterers). 
155 Mahoney, supra note 7, at 62; see also Coker, supra note 1, at 188 (“Abusive men 
cause women to lose jobs, educational opportunities, careers, homes, savings, their health, 
their ability to enter the workplace.”). 
156 Weissman, supra note 83, at 435. 
157 Lininger, supra note 6, at 769. 
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the home.158  When women with children do take the economic risk to 
escape abuse, they often find they are punished for their lack of resources 
with findings of child neglect and further state scrutiny.159
The complexity of this economic issue, however, cannot be ignored.  
Providing domestic violence victims with shelter, subsidies, and education 
after suffering from abuse are certainly important, but these remedies are 
not enough.  A key goal of domestic violence law and policy must be to 
address the institutionalized economic vulnerability of women in society. 
  Thus, some of 
the current policies in the criminal justice system may actually be putting 
some women in more danger due to their economic circumstances. 
In Justice, Gender, and the Family, Susan Okin gives an extensive 
analysis of this vulnerability.  She notes how women are socialized from an 
early age to believe that marriage and family are very important.160  Part of 
this socialization entails the expectation that the woman is to be the primary 
caretaker in the family.161  This expectation necessarily affects the choices 
that young girls make regarding the extent and field of education they will 
pursue and how purposeful they are about their careers; they are cognizant 
of the effects of family life on their work and the effects of work on their 
family life.162  As a result, the occupational aspirations of adolescents tend 
to be differentiated by sex, and this differentiation is similar to sex 
segregation that is found in the workplace.163
 
158 Barnett, supra note 
  Young girls are attracted to 
careers that can accommodate a parent who is the primary caregiver; these 
153, at 348 (citing research suggesting that twenty-one to sixty-
four percent of clients in shelters are homeless); Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in 
Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court 
System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 8 (1999). 
159 Mahoney, supra note 7, at 69–72. 
160 OKIN, supra note 25, at 142. 
161 Id.; see also JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK 
CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 1 (2000). 
162 OKIN, supra note 25, at 142. 
163 Id. at 142–43.  In 2007, only nine percent of female professional workers worked in 
the high-paying fields of computers and engineering.  U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, REPORT 1008, HIGHLIGHTS OF WOMEN’S EARNINGS IN 2007, at 2 (2008) 
[hereinafter HIGHLIGHTS OF WOMEN’S EARNINGS].  In contrast, forty-three percent of 
professional male workers worked in these fields.  Id.  Professional women are more likely 
to work in the lower-paying fields of education and health care; sixty-seven percent of 
female professionals worked in these fields in 2007, compared to only thirty percent of their 
male counterparts.  Id.  According to the Current Population Survey, in 2005, women made 
up only thirty-one percent of workers in the highest earnings category, while they made up a 
slight majority of those in the lowest earnings category.  U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ISSUES IN LABOR STATISTICS, SUMMARY 06-03, WOMEN STILL 
UNDERREPRESENTED AMONG HIGHEST EARNERS 1 (2006); see also WILLIAMS, supra note 
161, at 66 (“Three-fourths of all working women still work in predominantly female 
occupations.”). 
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careers tend to provide salaries on the lower end of the pay scale.164  These 
professions also tend to have less opportunity for mobility and 
advancement.165  In 2007, women who were full-time wage and salary 
workers made about eighty percent of what their male counterparts made.166  
The differential increased by age group.  Thus, women between the ages of 
sixteen and twenty-four made ninety-two percent of what their male 
counterparts earned, women between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-four 
made eighty-seven percent of what their male counterparts earned, and 
women between the ages of fifty-five and sixty-four earned only seventy-
three percent of what their male counterparts earned.167  These statistics 
demonstrate that women do not advance in their careers, and therefore do 
not increase their earnings, at the same rate as men.168
Because many women enter marriage making lower salaries than their 
spouses, the traditional family model where the wife handles a 
disproportionate share of the work at home makes rational and economic 
sense.
 
169  Since the husband is making more money, many families decide 
to make his career the priority, and the wife takes on more duties at home 
and becomes the primary caregiver to their children.170  The wife’s lower 
salary gives her less leverage in challenging the traditional division of labor 
in the household and in demanding more equal sharing of child-rearing and 
household chores.171  As a result, many men can work late hours and accept 
overtime assignments with the confidence of knowing that their wives are 
taking care of any home and family obligations.172
 
164 OKIN, supra note 
  In contrast, the amount 
25, at 143. 
165 Id. at 143–44. 
166 HIGHLIGHTS OF WOMEN’S EARNINGS, supra note 163, at 1. 
167 Id.  The differential decreases again for women sixty-five and older, who earned 
seventy-eight percent of their male counterparts.  Id. at 9 tbl.1. 
168 See also infra note 190 and accompanying text (discussing how career disruption 
during a woman’s childbearing years is another reason why women do not earn as much as 
men during the lifespan of their careers); WILLIAMS, supra note 161, at 66 (noting also that 
limited access to “mentoring and social contacts” impede promotion to high-level 
managerial and professional jobs). 
169 See OKIN, supra note 25, at 146. 
170 Id.  Interestingly, as a class, African-American men spend longer hours on household 
work than their Caucasian counterparts.  Yoshinori Kamo & Ellen L. Cohen, Division of 
Household Work Between Partners: A Comparison of Black and White Couples, 29 J. COMP. 
FAM. STUD. 131, 141 (1998).  Yet, overall, they still only perform 34.5% of the total 
household work load in their homes.  Id. 
171 OKIN, supra note 25, at 148.  Note, however, that as a class, women still perform a 
disproportionate share of household work even when they make equivalent or higher salaries 
than their husbands.  Kamo & Cohen, supra note 170, at 141. 
172 WILLIAMS, supra note 161, at 71–72, 79–81 (noting that the most successful 
executives tend to have wives who work full-time in the home and that the best factory jobs 
require overtime). 
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of time and energy needed to tend to their disproportionate share of work in 
the home173 provides many women with less time and energy for paid work 
outside of the home.174  Unfortunately, the distribution of power within the 
home can be affected by the possession by each spouse of resources valued 
outside of the home, specifically money and status.175  The distribution of 
duties between husbands and wives, therefore, reinforces the asymmetric 
power relation between them.176
In addition, discrimination in the workplace does not make it an 
attractive place for many women to be.  They are demeaned and sexually 
harassed, and they are represented in token numbers in positions of 
influence that could help shape workplace and political policies that would 
make things more equal.
  In other words, the limited access that 
many women have to the public sphere can decrease their economic and 
political power within the marital relationship and make them more 
vulnerable to subordination and violence. 
177  Employment discrimination issues are 
compounded for women of color and immigrant women.178  Not only does 
discrimination in the workplace limit some women’s economic 
independence, but this discrimination can also reinforce some women’s 
“choice” to focus more on household duties and to support their husband’s 
higher paying career.179
 
173 On average, women handle seventy-five percent of household duties.  SYLVIA ANN 
HEWLETT, OFF-RAMPS AND ON-RAMPS: KEEPING TALENTED WOMEN ON THE ROAD TO 
SUCCESS 36 (2007).  In addition, there is a growing trend where women’s caretaking duties 
include not only taking care of their children, but also taking care of their parents and 
grandparents.  Id. at 33–36.  On average, African-American women spend more time on 
elder and extended family care than Caucasian women.  Id. at 36. 
  Due to these stressors both inside and outside of 
174 OKIN, supra note 25, at 154–55; see Gavison, supra note 43, at 14; see also 
WILLIAMS, supra note 161, at 79–80 (noting how women are particularly disadvantaged in 
blue-collar jobs because taking time off to care for children affects their seniority and limits 
their time for extra training, both of which are crucial for advancement); Weissman, supra 
note 83, at 426 (noting that women that choose to focus more of their time on paid work 
outside of the home “are often disparaged as bad mothers”). 
175 OKIN, supra note 25, at 158; WILLIAMS, supra note 161, at 57. 
176 OKIN, supra note 25, at 156–59.   
177 Id. at 132–33; see also WILLIAMS, supra note 161, at 66 (noting the prevalence of 
sexual harassment in traditionally male blue-collar jobs). 
178 SCHNEIDER, supra note 44, at 63; Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: 
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 
1241, 1241–49 (1991).  In 2007, the median earnings for full-time wage and salary African-
American women workers was eighty-five percent of that earned by their Caucasian women 
counterparts.  HIGHLIGHTS OF WOMEN’S EARNINGS, supra note 163, at 8 tbl.1. 
179 OKIN, supra note 25, at 146–48; see also Gavison, supra note 43, at 17.  Note that 
African-American and Latina women make ninety percent of what their male counterparts 
make, compared to Caucasian and Asian women who earned only eighty percent of what 
their male counterparts earned.  HIGHLIGHTS OF WOMEN’S EARNINGS, supra note 163, at 1. 
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the home, some women even decide to focus on working in the home full-
time.180
Moreover, an increase in education level does not eliminate the issue 
of economic dependence for many women.
 
181  Indeed, while the number of 
women who have obtained graduate degrees and have aspired for more 
prestigious careers has increased since Okin’s analysis,182 it has been 
documented that there is a “brain drain” in these professions as many of 
these women either leave these careers entirely in order to work full-time in 
the home or they take a “scenic route”183 through their careers in order to 
allow more time to handle household demands.184  Most careers are still 
based on a model where the employee has a partner who is taking care of 
most of the duties in the home.185  Joan Williams describes this situation as 
the “ideal-worker” norm.186
 
Yet, these women still on average perform a disproportionate share of unpaid work in the 
home.  See supra note 
  Because many women still operate in a family 
169 and accompanying text.   
180 See Weissman, supra note 83, at 426 (noting also that women sometimes leave their 
jobs “because of their concerns that work outside of the home conflicts with the proper 
fulfillment of the role of a good mother”).  Of course, the ability to work full-time in the 
home is related to socioeconomic status.  For example, African-American women have 
always been more likely to work outside of the home than their Caucasian counterparts, 
beginning with slavery.  Kamo & Cohen, supra note 170, at 131–32.  In addition, shifts in 
the economy caused by globalization have made work outside of the home necessary for 
many women.  Weissman, supra note 83, at 410. 
181 See WILLIAMS, supra note 161, at 67 (noting that the narrowing of the gap between 
men and women in education level “has not led to proportional representation of women in 
high-level white-collar jobs”). 
182 See Lisa Belkin, The Opt-Out Revolution, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 26, 2003 at 44 
(noting that in 2003, sixty-three percent of the graduating class at Berkeley Law School, 
forty-six percent of the graduating class at Harvard Law School, and fifty-one percent of the 
graduating class at Columbia Law School were women; similarly, forty-seven percent of all 
medical students were women).  
183 “They don’t step out entirely; rather, they step back a bit—taking a part-time job, a 
flexible work arrangement, or a telecommuting option, or turning down a promotion, 
deciding that they cannot take on additional responsibility.”  HEWLETT, supra note 173, at 
29–30.  
184 Id. at 14, 43 (stating that thirty-seven percent of highly qualified women surveyed 
[defined as women with a graduate or professional degree or a high-honors undergraduate 
degree] voluntarily left their careers for a period of time, more than thirty percent took a 
“scenic route” in their careers, and many women found it difficult to re-enter the workforce 
on a full-time basis after taking time off); Belkin, supra note 182, (noting that ninety-five 
percent of Caucasian men with M.B.A.’s are working full-time, compared with sixty-seven 
percent of their Caucasian women counterparts; the numbers of African-American women 
are closer to those of Caucasian men).   
185 WILLIAMS, supra note 161, at 1. 
186 Id.  Williams notes that the ideal-worker norm does not define all jobs, but it does 
define the best jobs, including full-time blue-collar jobs and high-level professional jobs.  Id.  
In addition to working long hours, an ability to relocate is also important for advancement in 
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structure where they handle a disproportionate share of the duties of the 
home, however, managing a work–life balance has become difficult.187  
This reality is compounded by the experience of sex discrimination and 
harassment in the workplace.  Kathleen Gerson conducted a study where 
she found that many women made the decision to work full-time in the 
home at the same time that they became frustrated with the dead-end nature 
of their jobs.188  Similarly, women who originally viewed themselves as 
being more “domestically oriented” found themselves more career oriented 
when opportunities for work advancement opened up to them.189  This 
“brain drain” has serious economic consequences for this group of highly 
skilled women.190
Thus, Okin recognizes the interrelatedness of the public and private 
spheres in assessing the economic situation of women as a class.  She 
eschews the notion that one must choose either the “human capital” 
approach or the “workplace discrimination” explanation in determining why 
 
 
many careers.  Id. at 75.  Women are also disproportionately affected by this fact in that their 
partners are less willing to move for their careers or in that their careers are disrupted in 
order to support their partners’ relocations.  Id. 
187 HEWLETT, supra note 173, at 13–16; WILLIAMS, supra note 161, at 71–72, 79–81; see 
also Sylvia Ann Hewlett, We Can Stop the Female Brain Drain, SUNDAY TIMES (London) 
(Mar. 6, 2005), http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/article420087.ece (stating that the 
“overwhelming evidence shows that women want to work—and work hard—but they find it 
almost impossible to clone the unbroken, competitive model of work created by men”). 
188 OKIN, supra note 25, at 148; see also Hewlett, supra note 173, at 36–37 (noting that 
twenty-nine percent of women surveyed left their jobs because they were unsatisfying;  these 
numbers increased for women who worked in business and law: fifty-two percent and fifty-
nine percent, respectively). 
189 OKIN, supra note 25, at 148; see also Hewlett, supra note 173, at 37 (“A new child or 
a mother-in-law recently diagnosed with Alzheimers does not necessarily signal that a 
woman will quit.  Whether or not a woman off-ramps also has a whole lot to do with 
whether an employer can conjure up support—and opportunities—in the workplace.”). 
190 Obviously women who work full-time in the home become completely economically 
dependent on their spouses, but the decision to take a “scenic route” in one’s career also has 
consequences.  Ninety-three percent of women surveyed who left their careers eventually 
wanted to rejoin the workforce, but only seventy-four percent were able to do so.  HEWLETT, 
supra note 173, at 43.  Of the group that was able to rejoin the workforce, only forty percent 
were able to return to full-time positions.  Id.  Furthermore, on average, women lose eighteen 
percent of their earning power when they leave the workforce, even for a short period of 
time.  Id. at 45.  For those who spend three or more years outside of the workforce, they can 
lose as much as thirty-seven percent of their earning power.  Id. at 45; see also WILLIAMS, 
supra note 161, at 73 (“Even if someone who has been working part time later takes a full-
time job, she (or he) is likely to earn far less than someone who always worked full time.”).  
Williams also notes that workers who take advantage of “family friendly” part-time policies 
are more at risk for marginalization in the workplace and ultimately complete termination.  
WILLIAMS, supra note 161, at 74–75. 
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there are inequalities based on sex in the workplace.191  The human capital 
approach explains this inequality based on the notion that women “choose” 
to enter lower paying or more dead-end jobs because of expectations about 
their family lives.192  The workplace discrimination explanation looks at 
factors outside of the control of the female employee.193  Because the public 
and private spheres are interrelated, however, Okin recognizes that these 
explanations complement one another: “A cycle of power relations and 
decisions pervades both family and workplace, and the inequalities of each 
reinforce those that already exist in the other.”194
Furthermore, research on the effect of divorce on women underscores 
the difficulty many women have maintaining economic independence 
should they choose to separate from their partner.  Generally speaking, after 
divorce, women’s incomes fall substantially, while their husbands’ decline 
more modestly, or in many cases, their incomes actually rise.
 
195  As has 
already been stated, many women make substantially less money than their 
spouses in the workplace.  Yet, because women usually get custody of their 
children, they have larger economic needs than their husbands because of 
their larger households.196  Moreover, their work lives are constrained by 
the needs of their children.197  Thus, women who are already economically 
constrained because of their lower paying jobs find that their ability to 
improve their economic situation in the workplace is constrained by needs 
in the home.198
 
191 OKIN, supra note 
 
25, at 146–47; see also WILLIAMS, supra note 161, at 37, 83–84 
(arguing that the marginalization of women in the workplace is not just because of choice, 
but it is also a result of discrimination). 
192 OKIN, supra note 25, at 147. 
193 Id. 
194 Id.; WILLIAMS, supra note 161, at 38–39 (noting how the organization of market and 
family in American culture creates a “force field” that pulls women into “traditional gender 
roles”) (emphasis added). 
195 Pamela J. Smock, Wendy D. Manning & Sanjiv Gupta, The Effects of Marriage and 
Divorce on Women’s Economic Well-Being, 64 AM. SOC. REV. 794, 794 (1999).  But see 
Matthew McKeever and Nicholas H. Wolfinger, Reexamining the Economic Costs of 
Marital Disruption for Women, 82 SOC. SCI. Q. 202, 215 (2001) (discussing findings that 
suggest that women’s increased level of participation in the work force over the last several 
years has improved the general economic condition of divorced women).  Roughly forty 
percent of divorced women live in poverty, and a disproportionate number of their children 
“do not attain the educational level, or the class status, of their fathers.”  WILLIAMS, supra 
note 161, at 3. 
196 OKIN, supra note 25, at 162. 
197 Id. 
198 In 2007, unmarried women workers without children made fourteen percent more 
than married women with children.  HIGHLIGHTS OF WOMEN’S EARNINGS, supra note 163, at 
2.  In contrast, unmarried men with children made twelve percent more than unmarried men 
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To be clear, I am not arguing that there are not women who choose to 
become economically dependent on their husbands because they sincerely 
want to spend more time with their children and on household duties.  
Instead, I am arguing that because of the interrelatedness of the public and 
private spheres, it is difficult to determine how much of this choice is also 
influenced by the societal view that a good mother and wife should forgo 
career ambition outside of the home and by the difficult realities of the 
ideal-worker norm, which often includes sex discrimination and sexual 
harassment. 
I am also not arguing that every woman who is economically 
dependent on her partner is necessarily disempowered by that choice.  It 
certainly can be the case that a couple determines that it is most efficient for 
their household to divide the labor in such a way that the woman is 
economically dependent on her partner, but her partner still respects her and 
views her as an equal partner.  The point of this analysis is not to deny the 
possible existence of such a relationship.  In addition, the point of this 
analysis is not to suggest that women stay in abusive relationships only 
because of economic dependence.  As has already been discussed, there are 
a variety of reasons why a woman may remain in an abusive relationship.199  
Instead, the purpose of this analysis is to underscore that economic 
dependence can make women more vulnerable to violence in relationships 
that are abusive because it makes it more difficult for them to engage with 
the criminal justice system or for them to leave the relationship should they 
choose to do so.200  Obviously, the criminal justice system is not equipped 
to address the complexity of this issue.  For that reason, while criminal 
justice policies are important, it is also the case that domestic violence 
policies that focus more on improving the economic conditions of women 
will have a greater and longer lasting impact on many victims.201
 
without children.  Id.; see also WILLIAMS, supra note 
 
161, at 2 (noting that single mothers 
earn the lowest percentage of average men’s pay). 
199 See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
200 See supra Part III.C.2.a (discussing how a domestic violence victim faces a fifty 
percent chance that her standard of living will drop below the poverty level should she 
choose to leave her batterer and that nearly half of all homeless women and children have 
fled violence in the home). 
201 Some scholars have already begun proposing potential policies for improving the 
economic conditions for women.  For example, Susan Okin has argued that a partner who 
has been able to maintain a career “largely unencumbered by domestic responsibilities” 
should be responsible for supporting the other partner in the form of alimony and child 
support for at least the number of years the division of labor took place.  OKIN, supra note 
25, at 183.  Furthermore, she argues that “postdivorce households should enjoy the same 
standard of living.”  Id. (emphasis omitted).  She also argues that shared household duties 
between the sexes would require a change in the demands of work life, which is currently 
based on the ideal-worker norm.  Id. at 175–76.  Similarly, Joan Williams advocates for a 
2010] LOST IN TRANSLATION 1289 
b. Intersectionality 
Feminists of color recognized years ago that feminism must take into 
account the intersectionality of race, class, sexuality, and gender in 
women’s lives in order to have a complete picture of the subordination that 
all women experience.202  Race can compound the economic disparities that 
some domestic violence victims experience.  In 2007, the median earnings 
of full-time wage and salary African-American women workers was eighty-
five percent of those earned by their Caucasian women counterparts.203  The 
differential for Latina women was seventy-six percent.204  Women of color 
have been particularly harmed by the most recent economic recession.  
They have taken out a disproportionate share of subprime loans.205  In 
addition, a disproportionate number of low-income African-American 
women have been evicted from their homes.206
Women of color also have their own specific challenges when dealing 
with legal actors.  First, they especially have been victimized by dual arrest 
policies,
 
207 which provide that victims may be arrested along with their 
perpetrators when the police claim that they cannot determine who the 
aggressor in the attack was.208
 
restructuring of market work and family work so that the “ideal worker” can spend more 
time on caregiving and work performed in the home is valued so that women and their 
children are protected from economic vulnerability.  WILLIAMS, supra note 
  One of the reasons that African-American 
161, at 56.  She 
also suggests a way to calculate “income equalization” between separated households post-
divorce.  Id. at 115–16, 129–31.  Martha Fineman advocates the abolition of the legal 
category of marriage and the “redistribution or reallocation of social and economic 
subsidies” to the caregiver and her dependent, instead of to the “natural family.”  MARTHA 
ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH 
CENTURY TRAGEDIES 228–33 (1995). 
202 AUDRE LORDE, The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House, in 
SISTER OUTSIDER: ESSAYS & SPEECHES 110, 110 (1984); Crenshaw, supra note 178, at 1241–
45; see also Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. 
REV. 581, 585 (1990). 
203 HIGHLIGHTS OF WOMEN’S EARNINGS, supra note 163, at 8 tbl.1. 
204 Id. 
205 Heidi Hartman, Women, the Recession, and the Stimulus Package, DISSENT, Fall 
2009, at 43.  
206 Erik Eckholm, A Sight All Too Familiar in Poor Neighborhoods, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 
2010, at A14. 
207 Gruber, supra note 1, at 805–06; see also Sack, supra note 84, at 1680–81 (noting 
that women of color are more likely to be arrested than Caucasian women are and are 
charged with more serious crimes). 
208 Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 
1171, 1185 (2002) (noting that many statutes have “primary aggressor” language that require 
the police to determine who was the most significant aggressor).  But see David Hirschel et 
al., Domestic Violence and Mandatory Arrest Laws: To What Extent Do They Influence 
Police Arrest Decisions?, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 255, 296 (2007) (finding that 
overall dual arrest rates are low in domestic violence cases, but also noting that there are 
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women may be disproportionately affected by dual arrest policies is that 
they tend to fight back against their abusers at higher rates than their 
Caucasian counterparts.209  Yet because of the stereotypical image of the 
“angry black woman,” the police are more apt to view these acts as acts of 
aggression instead of as acts of self-preservation.210  In fact, Hillary Potter 
found in her discussions with African-American victims that in cases where 
they tried to physically defend themselves from their abusers, they were 
hesitant to call the police because they were afraid that they might be 
viewed as the aggressor, or at least as contributors to the abuse.211
Donna Coker notes that women who are arrested risk losing custody of 
their children, may be barred for life from receiving welfare benefits, and 
may have student financial aid compromised.
 
212  She also notes that arrests 
of immigrant women have also had disastrous effects because, not having 
proper legal counsel, they often plea bargain in order to avoid jail time, 
which can result in deportation.213  In addition, immigrant abusers may be 
subject to deportation if they are convicted of a domestic violence crime, 
which may be a result that many victims do not want, particularly if the 
partner is the primary economic provider.214
Some women of color have also found that police officers doubted 
their reports of abuse because physical evidence can be harder to see on 
darker skin.
 
215  In addition, the “angry black woman” stereotype not only 
applies to interactions with the police, but also to those interactions with 
legal and court personnel, including judges.216
 
considerable variations in dual arrest rates both among and within states); Sack, supra note 
 
84, at 1691 (arguing that discretionary policies would not solve the problem of victim arrest 
and that they might actually make the problem worse). 
209 POTTER, supra note 109, at 47.  A study by Russell P. Dobash and R. Emerson 
Dobash suggests that seventy-five percent of women who physically attacked their partners 
were acting in self-defense.  Id. at 119; see also Schneider, supra note 44, at 67 (stating that 
most women arrested for domestic violence were actually acting in self-defense in 
jurisdictions with mandatory arrest laws).  
210 See POTTER, supra note 109, at 180. 
211 Id. 
212 Coker, supra note 1, at 839. 
213 Donna Coker, Shifting Power for Battered Women: Law, Material Resources, and 
Poor Women of Color, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009, 1048–49 (2000).  
214 Id.  But see Sack, supra note 84, at 1693 (arguing that discretionary policies will not 
solve the problems that immigrant domestic violence victims face and that a better solution 
is to directly address immigration policy rather than dismantling mandatory policies). 
215 POTTER, supra note 109, at 178. 
216 Id. at 183–84; see also Leigh Goodmark, When Is a Battered Woman Not a Battered 
Woman? When She Fights Back, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 75, 99–100 (2008) (discussing 
how both the “angry black woman” or Sapphire stereotype and the promiscuous and 
dishonest Jezebel stereotype make it difficult for African-American women who fight back 
to get sympathy from judges and juries). 
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Furthermore, women of color and immigrant women often want to 
limit the amount of interaction they have with the criminal justice system 
because of the history of poor interactions between this system and 
communities of color and immigrant groups.  Kimberle Crenshaw has noted 
that these women do not want to “subject their private lives to the scrutiny 
and control of a police force that is frequently hostile” to people of color.217  
She argues that for members of racially subordinated groups, the home may 
function as a “safe haven from the indignities of life in a racist society. . . .  
[B]ut for this ‘safe haven,’ in many cases women of color victimized by 
violence might otherwise seek help.”218  Similarly, lesbians also are hesitant 
to seek out help from the criminal justice system because of a fear of the 
discrimination and “the sensationalism frequently visited on same-sex 
couples.”219  Lesbian victims who fight back against their abusive partners 
also tend to get less sympathy from legal actors.220
In addition, many African-American women may feel pressure to 
conceal the violence they experience because they want to limit racial 
stereotyping against African-American men.
 
221  Similarly, some Asian and 
Latina women hide the violence they experience at home in order to avoid 
shaming their families.222  Hillary Potter found that the African-American 
women she spoke with were hesitant to engage with the criminal justice 
system because of the imbalance in punishment imposed upon defendants 
based on race.223  Indeed, Donna Coker has noted that disproportionately 
high numbers of African-American and Latino men are subject to criminal 
justice intervention in domestic violence cases.224
 
217 Crenshaw, supra note 
  In addition, because of 
the prevalence of police brutality against African-American men, some 
178, at 1257.  But see supra note 109 and accompanying text 
(suggesting that some African-American women support criminal justice intervention). 
218 Crenshaw, supra note 178, at 1257. But see also supra note 109 and accompanying 
text (discussing studies that show that many African-American women do desire that their 
batterers be prosecuted).  
219 Weissman, supra note 83, at 401; see also SCHNEIDER, supra note 44, at 68–70.  It is 
important to note that the existence of domestic violence in same-sex relationships suggests 
that the traditional patriarchal analysis of domestic violence may be incomplete.  Id.  This 
fact underscores the importance of theorization that considers the intersectionality of various 
factors in domestic violence victim’s lives so that appropriate policies can be created that 
protected a larger segment of victims. 
220 Goodmark, supra note 216, at 112–13 (suggesting that the police may not be willing 
to intervene because they view the violence in same-sex cases as mutual). 
221 Crenshaw, supra note 178, at 1257. 
222 Id.; SCHNEIDER, supra note 44, at 64.  
223 POTTER, supra note 109, at 174. 
224 Coker, supra note 213, at 1034–45. 
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women are worried about how their partners will be treated by the police.225  
Because incarceration in general has had disproportionate effects on the 
poor, communities of color, and immigrant groups, Aya Gruber has been 
particularly critical of the current focus on arrest and prosecution within 
mandatory policies.226
Empirical research further supports the argument that an examination 
of the intersectionality of victims’ identities is an important aspect of 
creating domestic violence policy.  Many have concerns about mandatory 
arrest and prosecution policies given the fact that there is evidence that 
arrest and prosecution may not deter future violent conduct and that they 
may actually put some victims in more danger.  Support for the view that 
mandatory arrest could serve as a deterrent for batterers was originally 
supported by an early study conducted by Lawrence Sherman in the early 
1980s.  At that time, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) supported 
Sherman’s study of the Minneapolis Police Department, which involved a 
field experiment of misdemeanor spousal abuse with three intervention 
strategies: arrest, ordering the suspect away from the scene for twenty-four 
hours, and trying to restore order.
 
227  Based on the results from this 
experiment, Sherman concluded that arrest was the most effective treatment 
in reducing the likelihood of renewed violence.228
Sherman ended up questioning the results from his original study, 
however.  After his initial study in Minneapolis, the NIJ funded replication 
studies in six different cities.
 
229  The results from the experiments in 
Omaha, Nebraska and Charlotte, North Carolina suggested that arrest was 
no more of a deterrent than other types of police responses, such as 
separation or mediation.230
 
225 POTTER, supra note 
  The results from the experiment in Milwaukee 
suggested arrest reduced the likelihood of renewed violence for employed, 
married, Caucasian suspects who were high school graduates, but increased 
109, at 175.  Interestingly enough, Potter did not find that the 
women she spoke with felt guilty about the prospect of putting “another Black man” through 
the criminal justice system.  Id.  They seemed more concerned about taking their children’s 
father, anger from the batterer, or removing extra income.  Id. 
226 Gruber, supra note 1, at 798.  But see Sack, supra note 84, at 1690 (arguing that 
discrimination against the poor and people of color would be worse under discretionary 
versus mandatory policies). 
227 Richard A. Berk et al., Studies: A Bayesian Analysis of the Colorado Springs Spouse 
Abuse Experiment, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 170, 170–71 (1992). 
228 Id. 
229 Id. at 173–74; Lawrence W. Sherman et al., The Variable Effects of Arrest on 
Criminal Careers: The Milwaukee Domestic Violence Experiment, 83 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 137, 168 (1992). 
230 Berk, supra note 227, at 171–72; J. David Hirschel & Ira W. Hutchinson, III, Female 
Spouse Abuse and the Police Response: The Charlotte, North Carolina Experiment, 83 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 73, 115 (1992). 
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the likelihood of renewed violence for unemployed, unmarried, African-
American suspects who were high school dropouts.231  It should be noted 
that these replication studies have been criticized.232
Some may argue that issues related to race, class, and sexuality can be 
addressed by creating programs that encourage greater sensitivity within the 
criminal justice system.  These types of efforts are certainly important, but 
as is the case with the economic disparities that women experience as a 
class, a comprehensive solution to racism, classism, and sexism is clearly 
beyond the scope of the criminal justice system.  I do not raise this issue to 
suggest that the criminal justice system has no value in addressing domestic 
violence against women of color, but it is important to recognize the 
challenges of using a criminal justice solution in certain communities.  
Given that these challenges may cause some victims not to engage with the 
criminal justice system at all, a broader approach that includes solutions 
outside of the criminal justice system is critical in providing support for a 
larger group of victims. 
  Thus, at this point it is 
not clear how effective arrest is as a deterrent for future violence in a 
relationship, but the replication studies suggest that class and race are 
important considerations in determining the effectiveness of mandatory 
policies. 
 
231 Berk, supra note 227, at 173–74; see also Sherman et al., supra note 229, at 168. 
232 Joan Zorza has criticized the validity of the replication studies arguing that none of 
them fully replicated the original Minneapolis study or each other, each study had its own 
definition of a domestic relationship, and the type of police responses used in each study 
differed.  Joan Zorza, Mandatory Arrest for Domestic Violence: Why It May Prove the Best 
First Step in Curbing Repeat Abuse, 10 CRIM. JUST. 2, 4–5 (1995).  Critics of the NIJ studies 
also argue that it is incorrect to assume that renewed violence is a retaliatory response to 
arrest when the NIJ studies showed fewer re-offenses in the short term, and those treating 
batterers believe any retaliation from arrest would happen shortly after arrest.  Id. at 8; see 
also Cynthia Grant Bowman, Commentaries, The Arrest Experiments: A Feminist Critique, 
83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 201, 204 (1992) (arguing that the lower recidivism rate for 
employed men may be because their partners do not report future violence out of fear of 
sacrificing their lifestyle and status); Coker, supra note 1, at 856 (citing study that reviewed 
the NIJ arrest study data in Milwaukee and that concluded that residence in the most 
marginalized neighborhoods is a stronger predictor of increased violence following arrest 
than unemployment status); Lisa A. Frisch, Research that Succeeds, Policies that Fail, 83 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 209, 213 (1992).  But see Sack, supra note 84, at 1677–78 (noting 
that an important criticism of the NIJ replication studies is that they do not “examine the 
impact of the arrest policy in the context of other components of the justice system, such as 
prosecution and conviction rates, sentencing and monitoring policies, and access to services 
for victims” and stating that more recent reanalysis of the NIJ replication studies shows that 
there is a reduction in recidivism among domestic violence offenders who are arrested). 
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IV. CONSIDERATIONS FOR FUTURE REFORM 
Developing a global solution to the domestic violence problem is 
beyond the scope of this Article.  Using the personal experiences of 
domestic violence victims as a starting point, however, this Part will 
provide some thoughts about considerations that should be made with 
respect to future reform. 
A. REFORM WITHIN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
An important step with respect to criminal justice reform is to directly 
address some of the inadequacies that domestic violence victims are 
currently experiencing within the criminal justice system.  There are 
jurisdictions that have already begun to make such reforms.  For example, 
in Washington, D.C., in order to enhance victim safety, the courtrooms 
dedicated to domestic violence cases as part of the Domestic Violence Unit 
are staffed with several security guards.233  In addition, the Domestic 
Violence Intake Center, which is on-site at the courthouse, houses 
advocates who help victims with safety planning.234  The U.S. Attorney’s 
Office also runs a program that focuses on high-risk offenders and that 
collaborates with advocates who work with the victims in these cases.235
Furthermore, the Domestic Violence Unit seeks to improve victims’ 
experiences with the legal system and to keep them better informed about 
the legal process.  For example, independent victim advocates are present in 
the courtroom to assist victims during the court process.
 
236  The Intake 
Center is also staffed by independent victim advocacy organizations, the 
Office of Corporate Counsel, and prosecutors and advocates from the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office who address victims’ civil court and criminal justice 
needs in one place.237  Victims’ needs for material resources are also 
addressed in the Intake Center where representatives from victim advocacy 







233 EMILY SACK, CREATING A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURT: GUIDELINES AND BEST 
PRACTICES 55 (Lindsey Anderson et al. eds., 2002). 
234 Id. at 57. 
235 Id. 
236 Id. at 55. 
237 Id. at 57. 
238 Id. 
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In addition to Washington, D.C., many other jurisdictions have also 
improved coordination among courts, domestic violence organizations, and 
social service agencies.239  Chicago has implemented the Target Abuser 
Call (TAC) program.240  In 2004, the Department of Justice awarded over 
$20 million for the creation of Family Justice Centers around the country, 
which all also implement a coordinated community response.241  In July 
2005, one such center was opened in Brooklyn.242  In addition to 
implementing a coordinated community response, Brooklyn also has taken 
advantage of technological advances.  ADT Securities Systems has donated 
electronic alarm pendants to some of the most severely at-risk victims.243  
These pendants “send[] a level-two response through the 911 police 
emergency system, the same response used for a police officer in need of 
assistance.”244  Donated cell phones have also been distributed to some at-
risk victims that have a speed dial connection to 911.245
Preliminary research thus far suggests that a coordinated response 
between all parts of the criminal justice system and community-based 
organizations is a promising response to domestic violence at this time.
 
246  
In addition, these types of programs appear to have higher victim 
participation rates.247
 
239 Sack, supra note 
  Thus, it may be the case that victims’ participation 
rates may be increased by directly addressing the reasons why they 
ordinarily choose not to engage with the criminal justice system.  Moreover, 
if more victims participate in the prosecution of their batterers, it may be the 
84, at 1724–28. 
240 Bailey, supra note 90, at 49. 
241 Sack, supra note 84, at 1730; see also Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L FAM. JUST. 
CENTER ALLIANCE, http://www.familyjusticecenter.org/index.php/faqs/fjcs/frequently-asked-
question.php (last visited June 30, 2009). 
242 Charles J. Hynes, Combating and Preventing Domestic Violence, CRIM. JUST., Spring 
2010, at 47. 
243 Id. at 46. 
244 Id. 
245 Id. 
246 Sack, supra note 84, at 1726–28; see also GARLAND, supra note 74, at 205 (arguing 
that true crime control in modern society must involve coordination between the state, local 
organizations, and communities). 
247 For example, when adequately funded, as many as eighty percent of TAC victims 
participate in the prosecution of their batterers.  Bailey, supra note 90, at 50.  In a study of 
randomly selected cases from the TAC program and the General Court in Chicago, seventy-
three percent of the TAC victims participated in the prosecution of their batterers, compared 
to a forty percent participation rate in General Court.  CAROLYN COPPS HARTLEY & LISA 
FROHMANN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE COOK COUNTY TARGET ABUSER CALL (TAC): AN 
EVALUATION OF A SPECIALIZED DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURT 4 (2003), available at 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/202944.pdf. 
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case that more legal actors would be motivated to respond to victims’ cries 
for help, even without strict mandatory policies.248
On a practical level, however, funding is going to be a serious 
impediment to developing coordinated community response programs in 




Even with an increase in resources, however, it is not clear that these 
types of programs are going to be successful for all victims.  It could be the 
case that these types of programs will work best for high-risk cases where 
victims are in extreme danger, rather than for less severe cases.
  Yet, even small-scale programs that help only some 
domestic violence victims are better than no changes at all. 
250  In her 
discussions with African-American domestic violence victims, Hillary 
Potter found that few of them cited fear of further injury as a reason why 
they did not leave their batterer.  She did find, however, that fear actually is 
often an impetus to finally get out of a violent situation.251  Scholars also 
need to further research whether these programs, particularly those that are 
focused on prosecution of the batterer, are not coercing victims in ways that 
undermine their level of satisfaction with the criminal justice system.252
 
248 Some argue that mandatory policies are necessary to keep legal actors responsive to 
domestic violence victims’ cries for help.  See supra note 
  
Finally, as discussed in the Part III, efforts need to be made to improve 
relationships between the criminal justice system and poor communities and 
communities of color. 
104 and accompanying text. 
249 In fact, TAC’s focus on high-risk misdemeanor cases means that most domestic 
violence cases in Chicago do not go through this program.  In 2003, it was reported that 
TAC only took in about 1,920 cases per year.  Bailey, supra note 90, at 52 n.331.  It is 
estimated that Chicago has as many as 70,000 domestic violence cases per year.  Id.  
Funding for TAC from government grants has been reduced since the program’s inception.  
Id. 
250 TAC looks for repeat offenders at the misdemeanor level in order to stem violence 
before it escalates.  A focus group of lethality experts came up with a list of high-risk factors 
for escalating violence: strangulation, resisting arrest, violation of orders of protection, status 
of the relationship, public incidents of violence, and stressors.  The most important factor is 
whether the victim has indicated that she wants to end the relationship.  Bailey, supra note 
90, at 50.  In a study of randomly selected cases from the TAC program and the General 
Court in Chicago, “TAC women were significantly more likely to report prior defendant 
threats to kill and use of knife and gun in assaults than General women . . . .”  HARTLEY & 
FROHMANN, supra note 247, at 2. 
251 POTTER, supra note 109, at 145.  
252 Research suggests that participants in the TAC program have a higher level of 
satisfaction with legal actors in the criminal justice system than victims who are part of the 
General Court system in Chicago.  HARTLEY & FROHMANN, supra note 247, at 3. 
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B. NOT ALL INTIMATE VIOLENCE IS THE SAME. 
Empirical research suggests that not all of the violence that occurs in 
intimate relationships is the same, which is an important consideration for 
future domestic violence policy.253  Most of this Article has focused on the 
Coercive Controlling Violence model of abuse, which is the model that 
most people have in mind when they think about domestic violence.  Under 
this model, physical violence is part of a larger pattern of control, 
intimidation, and emotional abuse that the abuser wields over his partner.254  
The vast majority of the victims under this model are women.255  In 
addition, the violence is more frequent and severe under the Coercive 
Controlling Violence model than in other types of intimate partner 
violence.256  Male abusers are often characterized as having misogynistic 
tendencies in this category as well.257
In contrast, Situational Couple Violence does not have the same type 
of pattern of intimidation and control that the Coercive Control Model 
has.
 
258  Instead, this model involves specific situations or arguments that 
have escalated into violence.259  Unlike, the Coercive Control Model, men 
and women equally engage in violence in the Situational Couple Violence 
model.260  Fear of the partner is not characteristic of this type of violence, 
and men engaged in Situation Control Violence do not differ from 
nonviolent men on measurements of misogyny.261  While the violence that 
can occur under this model can sometimes be severe, in most cases it is less 
likely to escalate over time in the same way that the Coercive Controlling 
Violence model does, it sometimes stops altogether, and it is more likely to 
stop after separation.262
Separation-Instigated Violence occurs as a result of a separation in the 
relationship, but it differs from Coercive Controlling Violence in that there 




253 Joan B. Kelly & Michael P. Johnson, Differentiation Among Types of Intimate 
Partner Violence: Research Update & Implications for Interventions, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 476, 
476–77 (2008). 
  Violence can 
range from mild to severe, and it typically entails only one or two acts of 
254 Id. at 481–82. 
255 Id. at 481. 
256 Id. at 482. 





262 Id. at 486. 
263 Id. at 487. 
1298 KIMBERLY D. BAILEY [Vol. 100 
violence at the beginning or during the separation period.264  Both men and 
women engage in this type of violence, and parties typically comply with 
orders of protections that are issued against them to stop the violence.265
Current criminal justice policies seemed to be designed with the 
Coercive Controlling Violence model in mind.  While most of the cases that 
come in contact with the criminal justice system probably involve this 
model, empirical studies suggest that a significant number probably involve 
other types of violence.
 
266  Even if one assumes that mandatory policies are 
the best approach for the Coercive Controlling Violence model, it may not 
be the case that it is the best approach for other types of violence.  In 
addition, dual arrest policies seem to wrongfully arrest many women who 
are actually defending themselves or who are engaged in what has been 
called Violent Resistance.267
C. PRIVACY 
  Future domestic violence policy should 
acknowledge, therefore, the differences in the types of violence that can 
occur in intimate relationships in order to more effectively address each 
type of violence and in order to make sure that those who are defending 
themselves are not being punished unjustly. 
Because of the special nature of intimate relationships, some victims 
may view the violence in their home as a personal matter in the sense that 
they do not want criminal justice intervention under any circumstances.268  
Indeed, according to results from National Crime Surveys of Victimization 
conducted between 2001 and 2005, privacy is the most frequently cited 
reason for not reporting domestic violence.269
 
264 Id. 
  It may be the case that this 
statistic would change if domestic violence laws and policies were to 
address the economic realities of women and the negative interactions 
between domestic violence victims and legal actors.  But it also may be the 
case that some victims will always want their family lives to stay outside of 
the criminal justice system.  Interactions with the criminal justice system 
can have the effect of separating families and of subjecting families to 
265 Id. 
266 Id. at 482. 
267 Id. at 484–85. 
268 See Baker, supra note 79, at 1483 (“Most people would rather think of their families 
and personal lives as private . . . the battered women’s movement must be sensitive to how 
difficult it is for abused women to let go of an identity and private space that those lucky 
enough not to be in abusive relationship can still cherish.”) 
269 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 
IN THE UNITED STATES 28 (2007).  According to this report, 22% of female victims cited 
privacy as the reason for not reporting intimate violence.  Id. 
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humiliating state scrutiny.  Thus, it makes sense that some women may 
view a criminal justice solution to the violence they experience in their lives 
as an invasion of their privacy. 
While it is important to understand the political nature of private 
violence and to provide political solutions to this violence, many women 
are not seeking out any help at all because they are not comfortable with the 
public nature of the criminal justice system.  Perhaps a more grassroots 
approach, similar to the early battered women’s movement, that focuses on 
networks of supportive individuals who can provide victims with material 
and emotional support might be more appealing to some victims.  This type 
of approach gives victims access to help outside of the home, but it also 
allows for more privacy than a criminal justice response, which creates a 
public record of a family’s home life.  Unless this desire for privacy is 
acknowledged and further explored, a significant number of women will 
continue to be alienated and to suffer from private violence in silence.270
V. CONCLUSION 
 
By arguing that the personal is political, feminists challenged the 
notion that domestic violence is a private matter that should be handled 
within the family.  Instead, they argued that violence in the home is the 
result of the political disempowerment of women as a class.  As a result, 
this violence is appropriate for political analysis and regulation.  
Furthermore, by not regulating this violence, the state is complicit in the 
subordination of women in their homes.  Participants of the early battered 
women’s movement saw a role for the criminal justice system in addressing 
this problem, but they envisioned that victims would have autonomy in 
determining when this system would intervene in their lives.  This vision of 
autonomy, however, is not translatable within the current criminal justice 
system. 
Acknowledging that complete victim autonomy is not the primary 
objective of the criminal justice system, however, does not mean that 
proponents of current criminal justice policies should not be alarmed by the 
fact that such a high number of domestic violence victims do not want to 
engage with the criminal justice system.  Indeed, the limited number of 
victims who desire to engage with this system is an important metric in 
determining the criminal justice system’s effectiveness.  It underscores that 
improvements need to be made in the interactions that victims have with the 
system.  It also highlights the fact that the criminal justice system is a 
limited tool in addressing what is a social, political, and economic problem.  
Future policies should improve upon the experiences that victims have 
 
270 I plan to explore this issue of privacy further in future articles. 
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engaging with the criminal justice system.  They also should address the 
economic disparities that women experience as a class and the 
intersectionality of race, class, sexuality, and gender.  Finally, future 
policies should acknowledge that not all intimate violence falls under the 
Coercive Controlling Violence model and that the invasive nature of the 
criminal justice system may cause some victims to seek out less public 
solutions to the violence they experience in their lives. 
